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Classification of Participants in 
Suicide Attacks and the 
Implications of this Classification 
on the Severity of the Sentence: 
The Israeli Experience in the 
Military Courts in Judea and 
Samaria as a Model to Other 
Nations 
 
Amit Preiss* and Chagai D. Vinizky** 
 
Introduction 
 
The twenty-first century witnessed a considerable rise in 
the number of suicide attacks.  The largest suicide attacks were 
carried out by Al-Qaeda in the United States on September 11, 
2001, when that organization crashed four passenger planes 
(including two into the Twin Towers and one into the Pentagon 
building), killing 2,973 civilians.  Between September 11, 2001 
 
 [Editor’s Note:  Due to the inaccessibility of English translations for the 
Hebrew sources cited in this article, the editors of PACE LAW REVIEW have not 
reviewed the accuracy of all citations.  The editors have, however, verified 
many of the authors‘ general propositions concerning the Israeli case law 
cited in the article.] 
* Senior judge in the Military Court for Administrative Matters and 
acted in the past as the Deputy President of the Military Court in Samaria, 
holding the rank of lieutenant colonel. 
** Dr., lecturer at Sha'arei Mishpat College of Law, Israel, Judge (res.) 
in the Military Court in Samaria, holding the rank of captain.  We are 
grateful to Prof. Talia Einhoren, Dr. Leah Vizel, Dr. Hili Moodrick-Even 
Chen, Dr. Gabriel Hallevy, Col. Nethanel Benishu, the Deputy President of 
the Military Court of Appeal, Major Eyal Nun, Judge (res.) in the Military 
Court in Samaria and research assistant Erez A. Korn for their useful 
comments.  The Hebrew version of this article will be published in CRIME AND 
SOCIAL DEVIANCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Moshe Addad & Yuval Wolf eds., in 
print).  All the mentioned case law of the Israeli courts and of the military 
courts in Judea and Samaria are in Hebrew. 
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(hereinafter 9/11) and the time of this Article, suicide attacks 
have taken place in various countries throughout the world, 
including Turkey, Great Britain, Egypt, India, Jordan, Spain, 
and Iraq, leading to thousands of deaths.  A large proportion of 
the suicide attacks have been carried out in Israel.  This 
phenomenon was first seen in Israel in 1993 and continues to 
the present.  During the course of 125 suicide attacks, 718 
people were murdered.  As a suicide terrorist is willing to take 
his life in order to put into effect his plan, and therefore does 
not need an escape route, he is able to cause the death of 
numerous innocent civilians. 
The State of Israel, as a democratic state, has accumulated 
considerable experience dealing with this phenomenon through 
the use of legal devices.  Usually this criminal phenomenon 
cannot occur in the absence of terrorist infrastructures, which 
include a number of functionaries such as the dispatcher, the 
transporter, the intermediary, and the suicide terrorist.  The 
infrastructure that produces the suicide attacks in Israel 
generally originates in the region of Judea and Samaria.  By 
virtue of its power to issue the orders needed to maintain 
proper government and preserve public order and safety in this 
region, the Military Government in Judea and Samaria 
promulgated orders in regard to the criminal law, under which, 
inter alia, Military Courts were established to try persons 
charged with these offences.1 
As a large proportion of the suicide attacks are directed 
against Israeli citizens, and as many of those involved in these 
attacks are tried in the Military Courts in Judea and Samaria, 
the majority of the judgments given in respect of the 
participants in suicide attacks are the product of this system.  
Much of this case law has not been published and is not readily 
available to the community of lawyers and researchers.  It is 
not surprising that the ratio of studies to case law is extremely 
low.  As this is the legal system with the greatest experience in 
trying terrorists involved in suicide attacks, the ensuing case 
law holds great importance for countries which are victims of 
suicide attacks and have to conduct trials of those involved in 
them.  In this Article, we shall focus on the factual and legal 
 
1. Netanel Benishu, Criminal Law in the Administered Territories: 
Trends and Insights, 18 IDF L. REV. 293, 294-97 (2005) (Isr.).  The author 
also reviews the orders issued by the IDF on this matter.  See id. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/22
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classifications of the participants in suicide attacks and 
examine the implications of these classifications on the severity 
of the ensuing sentences. 
 
I. A Brief Overview of the Legal Regimes in  
Israel and the United States 
 
A pastoral atmosphere of tranquility at the heart of a 
vibrant city is transformed in an instant to a scene of loss, 
pain, and tears as a criminal takes his own life in order to 
achieve his goal of murdering innocent civilians.  The 
phenomenon of suicide attacks, which in recent years has 
affected numerous countries, has caused the death of many 
Israeli citizens.  In certain periods, this was a daily horror, and 
even now, after a significant decrease in the number of attacks, 
this is a phenomenon which can explode afresh at any given 
moment.2 
As Israel is a state governed by the rule of law, which 
combats its internal enemies by following the path of the law, it 
confronts this phenomenon by using legal tools—regardless of 
whether it is dealing with suicide attacks that have already 
occurred or with planned suicide attacks that have been 
frustrated in time, sometimes even at the eleventh hour, by 
virtue of the resourcefulness of the security forces.  Naturally, 
in the former case, the confrontation is with persons who do not 
bear direct criminal liability for the attack, as the direct 
perpetrator of the attack is no longer alive (except in those rare 
cases where the terrorist succeeds in killing others without 
concomitantly losing his life).  In the latter case, the 
confrontation is with the intended perpetrator of the attack as 
well as with those bearing indirect criminal liability. 
The majority of those responsible for committing suicide 
attacks in Israel are tried by the Military Courts of Judea and 
 
2. For an analysis of the various forms of terrorism, including specific 
reference to Islamic terror and one of its aspects, Palestinian terrorism, 
which includes suicide attacks, see Yuval Wolf & Ofir Frankel, Terrorism: 
Toward an Overarched Account and Prevention with a Special Reference to 
Pendulum Interplay Between Both Parties, 12 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 
259 (2007).  For a discussion regarding the phenomenon of suicide attacks, 
see also ANAT BERKO, THE PATH TO PARADISE: THE INNER WORLD OF SUICIDE 
BOMBERS AND THEIR DISPATCHERS (2007). 
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Samaria,3 as almost all those charged with responsibility for 
the commission of suicide attacks are Arab residents of this 
region (as distinct from Israeli citizens), and therefore are 
subject to the jurisdiction of this legal system.  The Military 
Court system consists of two courts of first instance, one for the 
region of Judea and the second for the region of Samaria, and 
an appeals court.4  In contrast to the system of military 
tribunals that are responsible for trying Israel Defense Force 
(IDF) soldiers, where the bench includes both judges possessing 
a legal education and a judge lacking a legal education, in the 
Military Courts system in Judea and Samaria, the trial is 
conducted solely by judges possessing legal educations.5  The 
prosecution is conducted by the Military Prosecutor.  In light of 
the gravity of the offences, those charged with responsibility for 
carrying out suicide attacks are represented by Israeli defense 
counsel or a resident of Judea and Samaria.  The trials are 
conducted in accordance with the Israeli laws of evidence, and 
many of the Israeli rules of criminal procedure also apply.  The 
substantive law consists of local statutes and orders issued by 
the Military Commander, in his capacity as the sovereign 
power in the occupied territory under the laws of war; however, 
with regards to the elements of the offences committed in the 
course of the suicide attacks, there are no major differences 
between this law and Israeli law.6  The relevant legislation in 
relation to the classification of those responsible for committing 
the offence is the Order Relating to Rules of Liability for an 
 
3. A minority of those responsible for suicide attacks have been tried in 
the State of Israel by virtue of parallel jurisdiction in certain situations.  See 
Penal Law, 5737-1977, S.H. 864, 226 §§ 7, 13-14 [hereinafter Israeli Penal 
Law].  In this connection, see also CrimC (TA) 1158/02 Israel v. Barghouti, 
[2003] Takdin Mehozi 2003(1) 327. 
4. Until the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip there was also a military 
court responsible for that region.  The court was closed upon the conclusion of 
the process of withdrawal.  It is noteworthy that the decisions of the Military 
Court of Appeal are subject to judicial review by the Supreme Court sitting as 
the High Court of Justice. 
5. In the past, the military court bench was also composed of judges 
lacking legal educations sitting alongside jurists.  In 2002, this practice was 
abolished, and all the judges in this legal system now possess a legal 
education.  For a further discussion on this process, see Benishu, supra note 
1, at 305-06. 
6. For a discussion regarding the legislative framework in which the 
military courts operate, the legal procedures, and the laws of evidence, see 
Benishu, supra note 1, at 294-304. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/22
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Offence (Judea and Samaria) (No. 225), 5728-1968.7 
The Military Court system in Judea and Samaria, which 
operates in accordance with the ordinary laws of evidence and 
rules of procedure, including legal representation for 
defendants, can provide a model for other countries that face 
the need to try a large number of persons accused of terrorist 
activities.  In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States was 
required to deal with the trials of those involved in terrorism in 
general, and those involved in suicide attacks in particular, 
including participants of the 9/11 attacks.  These alleged 
terrorists are accused of planning, mediating, couriering, and 
attempting to take part in terrorist attacks. 
During the American campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
the United States captured foreign nationals allegedly involved 
in terrorist activities.  Many of these individuals were 
transferred to the Guantánamo base in Cuba.8  While being 
held at Guantánamo, they were not given the rights usually 
afforded to detainees in the United States—i.e., they were not 
informed of the charges against them nor where they given 
access to counsel.9  Some of these detainees, through ―next 
friends,‖ challenged their detentions, alleging, inter alia, that 
they were being held unlawfully.10  They sought various forms 
of relief, including writs of habeas corpus.11  In Al Odah v. 
United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit ruled that foreign detainees in a 
territory that was not under the sovereignty of the United 
States—i.e., detainees held at the Guantánamo base—were not 
entitled to exercise the right of habeas corpus.12  In so ruling, 
the court relied, inter alia, on the Supreme Court‘s decision in 
 
7. Statutory compilation (Judea and Samaria) (no. 12), 467 [hereinafter 
Order Relating to Rules of Liability for an Offence]. 
8. See, e.g., Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1136-37 (D.C. Cir. 
2003), rev’d, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
9. See id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 1140-44.  See also Shaul Gordon & David Shoresh, The 
Military Commissions in Guantanamo and the Military Courts in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip – A Comparative Analysis, 2 IDF L. REV. 277, 282 
(2005). 
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Johnson v. Eisentrager.13 
In 2004, this decision was appealed to the Supreme 
Court.14  The Supreme Court accepted the appellant‘s 
argument and rejected the Government‘s position, drawing a 
distinction between the case at hand and the circumstances 
considered in Eisentrager.15  The Court held that while the 
United States lacked legal sovereignty in the Guantánamo 
area, in practice it was the sole governing body, and this gave 
rise to the Court‘s jurisdiction.16  In addition, the Court did not 
find any statutory authority denying courts‘ jurisdiction in 
such cases.17  Accordingly, the federal courts had jurisdiction to 
consider, within the framework of habeas corpus proceedings, 
whether foreign citizens were being lawfully held in 
Guantánamo Bay, and the government was powerless to 
prevent them from accessing the courts.18  At the same time, 
the Supreme Court refrained from ruling that foreign citizens 
detained in American detention centers around the world were 
always entitled to the right to habeas corpus.  The Court also 
declined to reverse the Eisentrager ruling, choosing instead to 
distinguish it from the case before it.19 
Following Rasul, and in the absence of relevant legislation, 
the United States Government decided to establish a system of 
military commissions in accordance with the principles of the 
 
13. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1138-45 (discussing and citing Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), intermittently). 
14. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
15. Id. at 476-79. 
16. Id. at 480-83.  See also Gordon & Shoresh, supra note 12, at 283. 
17. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483-85. 
18. See generally id. at 470-85.  In this connection too, it is worth 
considering the approach taken by the legal system in Israel in an analogous 
situation.  Following the Six Day War in which Israel seized the regions of 
Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip, the then-Attorney General Meir 
Shamgar (later President of the Supreme Court) decided not to argue that 
the residents of these areas lacked locus standi, and as a consequence of this 
decision, the Supreme Court of Israel granted locus standi to these detainees 
in the High Court of Justice.  See Meir Shamgar, Legal Concepts and 
Problems of the Israeli Military Government – The Initial Stage, in 1 
MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL, 1967-
1980: THE LEGAL ASPECT, at 13, 56 (Meir Shamgar ed., 1982); Moshe Landau, 
Fifty Years of Law in Israel: I do not Believe in Judicial Activism, 16 JUST. 3, 
4 (1998); LISA HAJJAR, COURTING CONFLICT: THE ISRAELI MILITARY COURT 
SYSTEM IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA 57 (2005). 
19. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475-79, 480-83.  See also id. at 487-89 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring); Gordon & Shoresh, supra note 12, at 284. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/22
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laws of war, which deviate from the customary legal process, to 
deal judicially with detained enemy combatants.  Under the 
Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), the federal courts were 
declared, inter alia, to have no jurisdiction to hear petitions 
brought by the detainees of Guantánamo.20 
The Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of these 
commissions in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.21  In Hamdan, the Court 
held that these ―military commission[s] . . . lack[ed] [the] power 
to proceed because [their] structure and procedures violate[d] 
both the [Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)] and the 
Geneva Conventions.‖22  First, the Court stated that the ―the 
UCMJ, the [Authorization for Use of Military Force], and the 
DTA at most acknowledge a general Presidential authority to 
convene military commissions in circumstances where justified 
under the ‗Constitution and laws,‘ including the law of war.‖23  
Then, the Court analyzed whether the military commission at 
issue met that standard.24  Particularly, Hamdan argued, inter 
alia, that the commission was illegal because he could ―be 
convicted based on evidence he [had] not seen or heard, and 
[because] any evidence admitted against him need not comply 
with the admissibility or relevance rules typically applicable in 
criminal trials and court-martial proceedings.‖25  Ultimately, 
the Court determined that court-martial rules had to apply in 
this case because it would not ―be impracticable to apply 
[them].‖26  The Court also held that the rules of the commission 
contravened Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which 
provides, inter alia, that in a conflict of this type every state 
has to comply with a minimum array of accepted rules and 
rights recognized as being immutable upon trying detainees—
including the basic right to be present during the trial, a right 
which was absent from the provisions of the Detainee 
Treatment Act.27  Accordingly, the commissions had not been 
 
20. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 
105(e)(3)(C)(ii), 119 Stat. 2680, 2743 (2005) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241). 
21. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
22. Id. at 567. 
23. Id. at 594-95. 
24. Id. at 595. 
25. Id. at 615-16. 
26. Id. at 623-24. 
27. Id. at 629-33, 635.  See also Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. 
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constituted under a law enacted by Congress as necessary, or 
in accordance with the laws of war, and, therefore, they had to 
be dismantled.28 
Following this judgment, Congress passed the Military 
Commissions Act (MCA),29 providing these commissions with a 
statutory basis, again negating the jurisdiction of the courts to 
hear habeas corpus petitions submitted by detainees in the 
Guantánamo base, and removing the right to contend that the 
rights set out in the Geneva Conventions applied.30  While the 
MCA enables appeals to be submitted to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, this 
procedure can only be pursued in extremely limited 
circumstances.31  Likewise, the MCA created a trial mechanism 
that was different from the ordinary legal process.32  For 
example, the MCA provided that: 
 
In establishing procedures and rules of evidence 
for military commission proceedings, the 
Secretary of Defense may prescribe the following 
provisions: . . . Evidence shall be admitted as 
authentic so long as -- (i) the military judge of the 
military commission determines that there is 
sufficient basis to find that the evidence is what 
it is claimed to be; and (ii) the military judge 
instructs the members that they may consider 
any issue as to authentication or identification of 
evidence in determining the weight, if any, to be 
 
No. 3364. 
28. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 635.  The Court so held even though it  
 
assumed . . . that the allegations made in the Government‘s 
charge against Hamdan are true . . . , that Hamdan is a 
dangerous individual whose beliefs, if acted upon, would 
cause great harm and even death to innocent civilians, and 
who would act upon those beliefs if given the opportunity. 
 
Id. 
29. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 
2600. 
30. Id. § 5(a), 120 Stat. at 2631. 
31. Id. ch. 47A, subch. VI, § 950f, 120 Stat. at 2622. 
32. See, e.g., id. ch.47A, subch. IV (―Trial Procedure‖), 120 Stat. at 2607-
17. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/22
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given to the evidence.33 
 
Following the passage of the MCA, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled on 
Guantánamo detainees‘ ―petitions for writs of habeas corpus[, 
which] allege[d] violations of the Constitution, treaties, 
statutes, regulations, the common law, and the law of 
nations.‖34  The detainees argued, inter alia, that ―the MCA, in 
depriving the courts of jurisdiction over the detainees‘ habeas 
petitions, violate[d] the Suspension Clause of the Constitution, 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.‖35  The court, citing to Eisentrager, 
ruled that terrorist detainees held in territory not subject to 
the sovereignty of the United States had no right to petition for 
habeas corpus and were not entitled to the protection of the 
Suspension Clause.36  Accordingly, no flaw could be found in 
the fact that the MCA precluded the federal courts from 
exercising the power of habeas corpus because the detainees 
were not accorded constitutional rights. 
The matter reached the Supreme Court.37  The key 
question was whether the detainees were entitled to 
constitutional rights and to the application of the Suspension 
Clause, enabling them to petition for habeas corpus.38  The 
Court held that Guantánamo Bay detainees suspected of 
terrorist activities could appeal to the civil courts regarding 
their administrative detention.39  The decision, reached by a 5-
4 majority, held that the detainees had a constitutional right to 
petition the courts to examine the justification for their 
continued detention.40 
The Court held that the Eisentrager ruling was not 
applicable to the Guantánamo detainees and that the right to 
habeas corpus was necessary to prevent the arbitrariness of 
government and to strengthen the principle of separation of 
 
33. Id. subch. IV, § 949a(b)(2)(D), 120 Stat. at 2608. 
34. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 128 S. 
Ct. 2229 (2008). 
35. Id. at 988. 
36. Id. at 989-94. 
37. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
38. Id. at 2240. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 2277. 
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powers.41  It ruled that the MCA infringed on the Constitution 
and the principle of separation of powers and, therefore, had to 
be invalidated.42  The Court declined ―to offer a comprehensive 
summary of the requisites for an adequate substitute for 
habeas corpus.‖43  It did, however, provide some guidance on 
the issue and ultimately ―[held] that when the judicial power to 
issue habeas corpus properly is invoked the judicial officer 
must have adequate authority to make a determination in light 
of the relevant law and facts and to formulate and issue 
appropriate orders for relief, including, if necessary, an order 
directing the prisoners‘ release.‖44  The Court, therefore, 
provided the President and Congress with a model of sorts that 
they could use to fashion new commissions that would not run 
afoul of the Constitution. 
In this context, it is possible to draw for assistance upon an 
amicus curiae brief, which was submitted to the Court in 
support of the petition by a number of Israeli experts.45  It 
presented Israel‘s method of coping with local terrorism over a 
considerable period of time.  This brief stated that Israel was 
committed to safeguarding human rights and accorded 
numerous legal rights and maintained due process in 
accordance with all the mandatory criteria necessitated by the 
framework of the Military Courts operating within the region 
of Judea and Samaria.46  This array of rights also applied in 
extreme situations, such as during the period of the Defensive 
Shield Campaign, and, as former President of the Israeli 
Supreme Court Aharon Barak formulated it: ―Every Israeli 
soldier carries, in his pack, the provisions of public 
international law regarding the laws of war and the basic 
provisions of Israeli administrative law. . . .  There is no 
security without law.‖47 
 
41. Id. at 2257-59. 
42. Id. at 2262-74. 
43. Id. at 2266. 
44. Id. at 2266-71. 
45. Brief for Specialists in Israeli Military Law and Constitutional Law 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 
(2007) (Nos. 06-1195 & 06-1196), 2007 WL 2441592.  The brief was written by 
Prof. Ariel Bendor, Prof. Eyal Benvenisti, Prof. Emanuel Gross, Prof. Asher 
Maoz, Prof. Barak Medina, Prof. Yuval Shani, and Prof. Amos Shapira. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 7 (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Chief Justice Barak). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/22
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On January 22, 2009, his first day after taking office, 
President Barack Obama signed an executive order directing 
the closing of the detention camp at Guantánamo Bay within a 
year.48  The order required a review to be carried out to 
determine whether the detainees should be transferred to other 
countries.49  With regard to those detainees who could not be 
transferred to other countries, the review would examine the 
possibility of pursuing criminal prosecutions against them 
within the United States and identify the appropriate court for 
the trial to take place.50  Likewise, a review would be conducted 
as to whether it was possible to continue detaining persons in 
the United States who could be neither released nor 
prosecuted.51  President Obama ordered a freeze on all 
proceedings in all trials being conducted in Guantánamo.52  
The freeze was aimed at enabling the administration to 
consider where it was possible to continue the prosecution of 
detained terrorist suspects. 
Adopting the system operating in the Military Courts in 
the region of Judea and Samaria to try terrorists can, in our 
opinion, resolve some of the problems raised by the case law, 
legislation, and executive order discussed above.  The Israeli 
experience shows that no difficulty ensues from enabling 
defendants to be represented.  On the contrary, it is 
unwarranted for defendants accused of such grave offences to 
be unrepresented.  Likewise, there is no need whatsoever for 
special evidentiary laws or rules of procedure.  It is possible to 
try a large number of defendants efficiently without any need 
to deviate from the ordinary laws of evidence and procedural 
rules which are designed, inter alia, to protect the right of the 
accused to due process.  We think that the Military Courts in 
Judea and Samaria can serve as an appropriate model to other 
countries that have to conduct trials against participants in 
suicide attacks. 
 
48. Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantanamo 
Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities, Exec. Order No. 13,492, 
74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009).  See also Charlie Savage, Delay Expected 
on Illinois Plan for Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2009, at A1 (reporting that 
officials believe Guantanamo Bay will be closed by 2011 at the earliest). 
49. Exec. Order No. 13,492 §§ 3-4, 74 Fed. Reg. at 4898-99. 
50. Exec. Order No. 13,492 § 4(c)(3), 74 Fed. Reg. at 4899. 
51. Exec. Order No. 13,492 § 4(c)(4), 74 Fed. Reg. at 4899. 
52. Exec. Order No. 13,492 § 7, 74 Fed. Reg. at 4899. 
11
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Likewise, it is possible to adopt the Israeli law relating to 
the Detention of Unlawful Combatants.  This law, 5762-2002, 
is intended, according to Section 1, ―to regulate the detention of 
unlawful combatants, who are not entitled to the status of 
prisoner of war, in a manner which is consistent with the 
commitments of the State of Israel under the legal provisions of 
international humanitarian law.‖53  According to Section 9, ―[i]t 
is possible to commence criminal proceedings against an 
unlawful combatant in accordance with any law.‖54  With 
regard to detainees who are too dangerous to release but who 
also cannot be prosecuted, it is possible to adopt the laws of 
administrative detention prevailing in Israel.  These laws 
incorporate rules of judicial review and the right of appeal to 
the Military Court of Appeal, which too is subject to judicial 
review by the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of 
Justice.  This course of action is not the preferred course, but is 
merely the course of last resort in these cases. 
Beyond a procedural comparison, it is also possible to draw 
lessons from the Israeli experience with regards to substantive 
law.  In this Article, we shall examine the classifications of 
various functionaries in a suicide attack (such as the 
dispatcher, intermediary, transporter, and prospective suicide 
terrorist) within legal categories applicable to participants in 
the offence (principal perpetrator, accomplice, accessory, and 
instigator) on the basis of extensive case law produced by the 
Military Court system regarding the classification existing 
under the Order Relating to the Rules of Liability for an Offence 
(Judea and Samaria).55  In this Article we shall not draw any 
 
53. Israeli Penal Law 5762-2002, 2002, S.H. § 1. 
54. Id. § 9. 
55. The Rules of Liability for an Offence (Judea and Samaria) (no. 225) 
5728-1968 [hereinafter Rules of Liability (JS)] are similar to the rules of law 
prevailing in Israel prior to Amendment No. 39 to the Penal Law.  See Israeli 
Penal Law (Amendment No. 39) 1994, S.H. 1481, 348 [hereinafter 
Amendment No. 39].  Therefore, they are unlike the law now prevailing in 
the State of Israel.  For a discussion regarding the current law in Israel on 
this matter, see, e.g., Miriam Gur Arye, Parties to an Offence – Amendment 
39 to the Penal Law as Tested by the Case Law, in DIRECTIONS IN CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY: INQUIRIES IN THE THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 83 (Eli Lederman ed., 
2001) (Isr.); Arnold Enker, On the Distinction Between a Principal Offender 
and an Accessory, 17 BAR-ILAN L. STUD. 339 (2002) (Isr.); Mordechai 
Kremnitzer & Liat Levanon, On Abetment of Crime and Interpretation of 
Criminal Law, 17 BAR-ILAN L. STUD. 403 (2002) (Isr.); CrimA (XX) 2796/95 
Anon. v. Israel, 51 [1997] P.D. 388(3); CrFH (XX) 1294/96 Meshulam v. 
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additional comparisons with the various legal classifications 
made in other legal systems that bring to trial those involved 
in suicide attacks.  Attempting a comparison with the legal 
categories prevailing in any legal systems that may deal with 
the need to try participants in suicide attacks, such as those of 
Israel, England, Spain or the United States, would have 
created a great deal of obscurity and prevented this Article 
from achieving its goals.  Such comparisons are worthy subjects 
of future articles.  Within the framework of this Article, we 
shall present the extensive case law which has accumulated in 
relation to the classification of participants in suicide attacks 
in the Military Court system operating in the region of Judea 
and Samaria.  We shall also examine the impact this 
classification has had on the severity of the penalty, so that 
those responsible for the judiciary in each legal system can 
learn from this case law about the appropriate standard of 
severity of the sentences which should be imposed on each 
functionary per se and relative to the others, in the chain 
which ultimately brought about the suicide attacks. 
 
II. Definition of the Term ―Suicide Attack‖ 
 
What does the term ―suicide attack‖ mean?  Does it refer to 
every attack in which the actual or potential direct perpetrator 
plans to lose his life during the process of executing it?  Or, 
does it perhaps refer only to attacks in which the means of 
attack is a bomb carried on the body of the suicide attacker or 
placed in proximity to him?  This question does not have legal 
significance when inquiring into the guilt of an alleged 
terrorist.  In all of the cases where murder is committed, 
including cases of suicide attacks, the relevant offence is 
deliberately causing death contrary to Section 51 of the Order 
Relating to Defense Regulations (Judea and Samaria) (No. 378) 
5730– 1970 (or an attempt to commit such an offence, in the 
event that the offence failed).56  Accordingly, at this stage there 
 
Israel, 52 [1998] P.D. 1(5); SCrF (TA) 1158/02 Israel v. Barghouti, [2004] 
Takdin Mehozi 3430(2).  For a comparison between the law prevailing prior 
to Amendment No. 39 and the subsequent law in relation to the issue of those 
liable for an offence, see IAAKOV KEDMI, ON CRIMINAL LAW: THE PENAL LAW, 
315-408 (2005) (Isr.). 
56. The offence of causing death deliberately is somewhat wider than the 
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is no need to define the term ―suicide attack‖ because all lethal 
attacks, suicide attacks included, are treated as murders. 
The definition of the term ―suicide attack‖ is relevant only 
when determining the penalty, and in particular, when the 
court is considering the offence of an attempt to deliberately 
cause death.  This is because in the completed offences of 
deliberately causing death, whether reference is to a suicide 
attack or to a different act of murder, the customary penalty is 
imprisonment for life,57 save in exceptional circumstances 
where there are alleviating factors which focus not on the 
manner of commission of the murder but on the degree of 
involvement of the accused in the act of murder, or, special 
circumstances which relate to the level of understanding and 
judgment of the accused (particularly the fact that the accused 
is a minor).  In contrast, when the offence is one of attempt to 
deliberately cause death, the definition of the term ―suicide 
attack‖ is particularly important.  For this offence, a sentence 
of life imprisonment is the exception and not the rule, as the 
actions have not led to the death of a person.  Nonetheless, as 
we shall see below, this exception comes into play principally 
(albeit not in every case) where there is an attempt to cause 
death deliberately by means of a suicide attack.58  Accordingly, 
the question of the definition of the term ―suicide attack‖ is 
highly relevant when the offence is one of an attempt to cause 
death deliberately by means of a suicide attack. 
One type of case that involves the query as to which 
 
corresponding provision in Israeli law—namely, the offence of premeditated 
murder under Israeli Penal Law 5737-1977, S.H. § 300(a)(2).  For further 
discussion of this, see (JS) 79/99 Shamasna v. Military Prosecutor, [2005] 
Judgments of Adm. Terr. 14(1) 1. 
57. The maximum penalty for the offence of causing death deliberately is 
death.  At the same time, the military courts in Judea and Samaria have 
never imposed the death penalty in a final judgment, and for many years, the 
military prosecutor has also not petitioned for this penalty.  Accordingly, in 
practice, the maximum penalty is life imprisonment.  For a discussion on the 
issue of the death penalty, see Ofer Ben Haim, The Death Penalty in the Case 
Law of the Military Courts in Israel and the Administered Territories, 10 IDF 
L. REV. 35 (1989) (Isr.). 
58. This exception of life imprisonment for acts which have not led to the 
death of a person was also recognized in certain circumstances where the 
accused participated in a large number of attempts to cause death 
deliberately.  For a discussion on this, see Appeals (JS) 120+122+151+153/02 
Nofel v. Military Prosecutor and Counter Appeal, [2003] Judgments of Adm. 
Terr. 14(1) 260 (unpublished). 
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situations are included within the term ―suicide attack‖ is 
where planned massive gunfire is directed at a place teeming 
with human beings—or where such planned shooting is 
stopped in mid-fire—and the shooter is willing to lose his life 
during the commission of this offence.  Such an attack is often 
called a ―no-escape attack.‖  In other words, there are those 
who distinguish literally between this form of attack and the 
more familiar form of attack in which the potential or actual 
suicide terrorist carries an explosive device on his body and 
acts as a ―living bomb.‖ 
In the Ha’nini judgment,59 the Military Court of Appeal for 
the first time directly considered the question of the above 
definition.60  This case involved the trial of a defendant who 
had planned to commit a ―no-escape attack‖ together with 
another person.  The attack failed.  When the defendant and 
his friend were close to their destination, they were stopped by 
IDF soldiers who opened fire on them.  In reply, the defendant 
and his friend directed rapid fire at the soldiers and ran away 
from the site.  The court held that the type of cases known as 
―no-escape attacks‖ falls within the definition of ―suicide 
attacks.‖  In making this finding, the Military Court of Appeal 
preferred following an expansive approach to the definition of 
the term ―suicide attacks.‖  The court emphasized the 
willingness of the potential attacker to lose his life during the 
course of the attack.  In the opinion of the court, this 
willingness negated the difference in the potential killing 
between an attack by means of a ―living bomb‖ and a ―no-
escape attack.‖ 
In criticism of the adoption of the expansive approach, it is 
possible to note a number of grounds that support taking the 
narrow view that the ―no-escape‖ type of attack should not be 
classified as a ―suicide attack.‖  These grounds were set out by 
one of the judges in the court of first instance in Ha’nini.61  For 
the purpose of fair disclosure, it should be noted that that judge 
 
59. Appeals (JS) 1049/05+45/04 Military Prosecutor v. Ha'nini and 
Counter Appeal, [2005] (unpublished). 
60. The Military Court of Appeal discussed this matter obiter even 
beforehand in Appeals (JS) 1468/04 Shalabi v. Military Prosecutor, [2005] 
(unpublished). 
61. Ct.  (JS)  6249/03 Military Prosecutor v. Ha'nini, [2004] 
(unpublished). 
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was one of the authors of this Article.62 
According to the expansive approach, which has been 
accepted as the prevailing legal ruling, a person who was on 
the verge of committing a ―no-escape attack‖ will be sentenced 
to life imprisonment.  This was indeed the sentence imposed on 
the defendant in Ha’nini.  However, when the case concerns a 
defendant who carried out a shooting attack with the intention 
of murdering a large number of people using measures 
appropriate for that purpose (from the point of view of the type 
of weapon, shooting range, lack of protection of the targets, 
etc.), but without the intention of losing his life in the process, 
then, according to the rulings of the Military Court of Appeal, 
that defendant will be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 
about ten years.  This outcome is incoherent as a defendant 
who has been stopped on his way to a ―no-escape attack‖ 
without having fired a single shot may be sent to prison for the 
rest of his life.  In contrast, a defendant who has carried out a 
shooting attack, including cases where rapid fire is carried out 
and miraculously does not lead to the death of others, will be 
sentenced to a completely different quantitative and qualitative 
penalty merely because he did not intend to take his own life. 
This problematic outcome, which ensues from the 
emphasis placed on the willingness of the attacker to take his 
own life during the course of the attack without regards to the 
potential death toll resulting from his acts, will lead to the 
situation where even someone who is willing to commit suicide 
 
62. Amit Preiss was one of the judges in the court of first instance in 
Ha’nini.  The second author of this article, Chagai Vinizki, actually supports 
the position adopted by the Military Court of Appeal.  There have been a 
number of ―no-escape attacks‖ in which numerous people were killed.  One 
example is the attack at Virginia Tech on April 17, 2007, in which thirty-two 
people were killed in a no-escape type killing spree begun by a student who 
ultimately also killed himself.  See Virginia Tech Shootings: Lives Lost, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2007, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2007/04/18/AR2007041802607.html.  On the other hand, there have also been 
many ―living bomb‖ suicide attacks resulting in multiple injuries but in which 
no people were killed at all or which resulted in only a few fatal injuries.  
Even though it may be assumed that on average there will be more victims in 
―living bomb‖ type suicide attacks than in ―no-escape‖ type suicide attacks, 
the important factor is still the murderer‘s willingness to kill a large number 
of people accompanied by a willingness to take his own life.  This willingness 
enables the murderer (both the ―living bomb‖ type and the ―no-escape‖ type) 
to harm a large number of people without need to ensure an escape route, 
and therefore a uniform classification must be given to the two cases. 
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during the course of a knife attack will be regarded as a suicide 
attacker.  This hypothetical knife attacker will, therefore, be 
sentenced to life imprisonment.  This ignores the fact that the 
potential risk involved in a knife attack is immeasurably 
smaller than the potential risk entailed by a shooting attack, 
and the potential risk entailed by a shooting attack is smaller 
than the potential risk entailed by an attack involving a ―living 
bomb.‖  From the point of view of the court‘s judgments, 
however, there is no difference between a knife attack, a 
shooting attack, and an attack involving a ―living bomb,‖ so 
long as the attacker intends to take his own life during the 
course of the assault. 
The difference between the three types of attacks does not 
only apply in relation to the potential risk but also in relation 
to the ability to prevent the attack.  When the attack is one 
which is to be conducted by means of a ―living bomb,‖ the 
terrorist can easily reach the center of the crowd with the 
explosive device strapped to his body or carried in a bag, and 
with one push of the button, destroy all those surrounding him.  
In contrast, when the attack is a ―no-escape attack,‖ the 
shooter will find it difficult to conceal his weapon (apart from 
cases when he is merely using a pistol) and therefore he will 
find it difficult to reach the center of the crowd without being 
disturbed.  Moreover, in a ―no-escape attack‖ the shooter 
cannot injure a large number of people in a single instant, 
compared to a terrorist who acts as a ―living bomb,‖ who needs 
only to press a button in order to execute a mass killing.  The 
shooter in a ―no-escape attack‖ is required to carry out a series 
of acts which include drawing the weapon, aiming it, and firing 
it intermittently, while during this period, which can last for a 
number of minutes, it is possible to thwart the continued 
commission of the attack and save the lives of potential 
victims. 
In view of these differences, it is desirable (contrary to the 
Ha’nini ruling) to create a categorical distinction between the 
two types of attacks.  This way those involved in ―no-escape 
attacks‖ which have not achieved their goals, will not be given 
the maximum penalty of life imprisonment, but rather a 
sentence of imprisonment for a term of years, the length of 
which is consistent with the degree to which the attack 
succeeded, the level of involvement of the defendant in the 
17
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attack, and other punitive considerations. 
So far we have considered the definition of the term 
―suicide attack.‖  As noted, the case law has chosen to adopt the 
expansive approach to this act, so that the definition will also 
include the class of ―no-escape attacks.‖  We shall now describe 
how the case law has dealt with the other aspects of suicide 
attacks.  For this purpose, we shall draw a distinction between 
suicide attacks which succeed, that is, which lead to the deaths 
of others—and therefore, the offence is one of causing death 
deliberately—and suicide attacks which fail during one of the 
stages of the attempt to commit them—and therefore, the 
offence is one of attempting to cause death deliberately. 
 
III. Suicide Attacks that Succeed 
 
A. Background 
 
When, unfortunately, the suicide attack has achieved its 
goal—the murder of innocent people—the relevant offence is 
causing death deliberately.  In these cases, in light of the 
gravity of the offence, the general rule is that a sentence of life 
imprisonment will be imposed; only in exceptional cases will a 
more lenient sentence of a term of years be imposed.  The 
decision whether to apply the rule or the exception in cases of a 
suicide attack is based on the degree of involvement of the 
accused in the successful suicide attack.  The degree of 
involvement of the accused is derived from the classification of 
liability for his acts.  In other words, it depends on whether he 
is the principal perpetrator, an accomplice, an accessory, or an 
instigator.  Accordingly, as a starting point for determining the 
penalty to be imposed on the various persons involved in a 
suicide attack, it is necessary to consider the legal categories of 
the participants in the offence, as established in the law 
applied by the Military Courts in Judea and Samaria.  This 
classification is conducted in accordance with Section 14(a) of 
the Order Relating to the Rules of Liability for an Offence 
(Judea and Samaria) which provides that: 
 
a.  Where an offence is committed, each of the 
following is deemed to have taken part in its 
commission and to bear responsibility for it, 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/22
738 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
and it is possible to charge him with 
commission of the offence: 
 
1.   Any person who does the act or one of 
the acts or makes the omission or one 
of the omissions which constitute the 
offence, 
 
2.   Any person who does or omits to do 
any act for the purpose of enabling or 
aiding another person to commit the 
offence, 
 
3.   Any person who, whether or not he is 
present at the time the offence is 
committed, aids another person to 
commit the offence, a person is 
deemed to have aided another if he is 
present at the place where the offence 
is committed for the purpose of 
overawing opposition or of 
strengthening the resolution of the 
perpetrator or of ensuring the carrying 
out of the offence which is due to be 
committed, 
 
4.   Any person who counsels or procures 
any other person to commit the 
offence, whether or not he is present 
at the time the offence is committed. 
 
The above Section 14 is similar in substance (albeit not 
identical) to Section 26 of the Penal Law, 5737-1977, prior to 
being amended by Amendment No. 39.  As the above 
amendment was not adopted in the legislation applicable to the 
region of Judea and Samaria, the law in these areas is similar 
to the law prevailing in Israel prior to the above amendment 
and is substantively different from the law applicable in Israel 
today.  When the Military Court of Appeal was required to 
interpret Section 14, it held that the first alternative in 
subsection (a) of Section 14 concerned the principal perpetrator 
19
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of the offence, the second concerned an accomplice to an 
offence, the third an accessory, and the fourth a counselor or 
instigator.63 
It should be emphasized that according to Section 14, any 
person falling within one of the four categories mentioned will 
be deemed guilty of committing the offence, and in principle, 
may be subject to the maximum penalty set for the offence 
committed.64  This is in contrast to the position in Israeli law 
after Amendment No. 39, which distinguishes between 
someone who is classified as the perpetrator or instigator, who 
may be subject to the maximum penalty set for the offence 
committed, and someone who is classified as an accessory to 
the offence, who may be subject to only half the penalty set for 
the offence (apart from certain exceptions).65 
However, in a number of fundamental judgments66 that 
will be reviewed in detail below, the Military Court of Appeal 
recognized the possibility that classification of the various 
participants in the commission of an offence would dictate the 
imposition of different penalties, even though the maximum 
penalty would be identical in relation to all the participants, 
whatever their classification.  This ruling was given in the case 
of defendants who were convicted of involvement, as 
accessories or accomplices, in offences of causing death 
deliberately through suicide attacks.  The ruling recognized the 
possibility of a distinction between the penalty given to the 
principal perpetrator and the penalty given to the accomplice 
or accessory.  However, concurrently, it did not negate the 
possibility that there would be no distinction between the 
penalty of the first and the penalty of the second or third 
participants where the choice between the possibilities would 
be consistent with the circumstances of the case under 
consideration. 
We shall now turn to an examination of the legal 
 
63. See, e.g., Appeals (JS) 320+323/03 Military Prosecutor v. Ali and 
Counter Appeal, [2004] (unpublished). 
64. Order Relating to the Rules of Liability for an Offence (JS) (no. 225), 
1968, S.H. § 14. 
65. Israeli Penal Law, § 32. 
66. See, e.g., Appeals (JS) 65/02 Moukadi v. Military Prosecutor, [2003] 
Judgments of Adm.Terr. 14(1) 159; Appeals (JS) 101/03 A'amouri v. Military 
Prosecutor, [2004] (unpublished). 
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classifications, in so far as they are relevant to suicide attacks.  
Initially, we shall consider, in relation to each classification, 
which of the ―jobholders‖ involved in the suicide attack are 
contemplated by it, and next we shall examine how this 
classification has influenced the penalty imposed on each 
―jobholder.‖  As the offence is one of causing death deliberately, 
the classification will have ramifications for deciding whether 
the derivative penalty will be life imprisonment or 
imprisonment for a term of years. 
 
B. The Principal Perpetrator 
 
Who is considered to be the principal perpetrator in a 
suicide attack?  As will be explained below, the Military Court 
of Appeal applied this legal category, which is the subject of 
Section 14(a)(1) of the Order Relating to Liability for an 
Offence, exclusively to the suicide terrorist himself.  This was 
held in the judgment in Ha’nini.67  This case concerned one of 
the first suicide attacks in Israel, carried out in the Mechola 
junction in the Jordan Valley in 1993, in which the suicide 
terrorist detonated a car that he was driving, which was laden 
with explosives.  As a result of the attack, one person was 
killed and many others were injured.  The defendant was a 
Hamas operative who was involved in planning the attack and, 
in particular, preparing the explosive vehicle after he had 
received instructions to generate a suicide attack.  When 
considering the classification of the accused‘s liability for the 
purpose of Section 14(a), the Military Court of Appeal held that 
the defendant could not be deemed to be a principal perpetrator 
as he was not the one who had carried out the direct act 
leading to the death of the victim, that is, he was not the one 
who had detonated the lethal explosives.  In other words, it was 
held that the principal perpetrator of the suicide attack was 
exclusively the person who had detonated the explosives (and 
with reference to a ―no-escape attack,‖ which it will be recalled 
was also defined as a suicide attack, exclusively the one who 
carried out the fatal shooting).  The significance of this was 
that only the suicide terrorist could be the principal 
 
67. Appeals (JS) 64+66/02 Military Prosecutor v. Ha'nini and Counter 
Appeal, [2004] Judgments of Adm.Terr. 14(1) 136. 
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perpetrator of the suicide attack.  An identical ruling whereby 
only the suicide terrorist could be the principal perpetrator was 
delivered in the case of Abu Saris.68 
A different broader approach regarding the definition of 
the principal perpetrator of a suicide attack was pursued in 
Shachshir.69  This was a judgment given by the court of first 
instance, prior to the Ha’nini ruling, which became final in the 
absence of an appeal against it.  The case concerned a person 
involved in a suicide attack in the Halisa neighborhood of Haifa 
in 2001, where fifteen people were murdered and numerous 
others were injured.  The defendant had participated in the 
attack by agreeing to the suicide terrorist‘s request for 
assistance and arranging for a meeting between him and an 
operative of the military branch of Hamas.  Afterwards, that 
operative, together with others, prepared and dispatched the 
suicide terrorist to carry out the attack. 
The court classified the defendant as a principal 
perpetrator on the ground that a principal perpetrator, within 
the meaning of Section 14(a)(1), is anyone who performs the 
elements of the offence.  When the offence is causing death 
deliberately, the elements of the offence are deliberately 
causing the death of another.  Upon the existence of a causal 
connection between the acts of the accused and the lethal 
outcome, accompanied by the mental element of intent, there is 
a deliberate causation of the death of another, a situation 
which places the accused in the category of a principal 
perpetrator.  Put differently, this decision includes within the 
category of a principal perpetrator of a suicide attack that has 
succeeded, not only the suicide terrorist who embodies the 
closest link to the lethal outcome of the attack, but also all the 
links who preceded him in the chain of causal connection (i.e., 
those who made an indispensable contribution to the 
commission of the offence and foresaw, or should have foreseen, 
the occurrence of the lethal outcome)—provided only that they 
had the accompanying mental element of intent to cause the 
 
68. Appeals (JS) 2003/05 Abu Saris v. Military Prosecutor, [2006] 
(unpublished) (finding that the defendant had no primary liability as part of 
the inner circle, but that he was criminally liable as an accessory to the 
crime). 
69. Ct. (JS) 6184/03 Military Prosecutor v. Shachshir, [2003] 
(unpublished). 
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death of others.  As noted, the Ha’nini ruling was later handed 
down, applying the category of principal perpetrator solely to 
the suicide terrorist.  As we shall see below, in later case law, 
defendants who under the Shachshir ruling would have been 
deemed to be principal perpetrators, because of the existence of 
a causal connection between their acts and the resulting lethal 
attack, were placed in other categories. 
In view of the unique characteristics of a suicide attack, 
the significance of the Ha’nini ruling is that the principal 
perpetrator of the offence will not be tried, if indeed he died 
during the course of the attack.  It should be noted that, in fact, 
there have been situations where a ―no-escape attack,‖ which it 
will be recalled has been held by the case law to be a suicide 
attack, has ended with the potential suicide terrorist 
succeeding in killing others but remaining alive; however, so 
far, no terrorist who intended to commit suicide but remained 
alive has been placed on trial—either because the terrorist was 
not caught or was subsequently killed.  In these circumstances, 
the judicial delineation of the category of principal perpetrator 
in relation to suicide attacks is, in effect, purely negative, as its 
implementation in relation to defendants is limited to 
excluding them from this category, in the absence of any 
practical possibility of including any defendant within the 
category. 
 
C. The Accomplice 
 
As explained, the Ha’nini ruling confined the category of 
―principal perpetrator‖ exclusively to the suicide terrorist.  As a 
result, the categories relevant to the other participants in the 
preparation and execution of the suicide attack are: ―the 
accomplice,‖ ―the accessory,‖ and, where someone instigates the 
attack but does not take part in its preparation or execution, 
―the instigator.‖  Drawing a distinction between the categories 
of ―accomplice‖ and ―accessory‖ is not straightforward, and, 
consequently, there has been considerable discussion in the 
case law in this regard. 
In Ha’nini, the Military Court of Appeal dealt for the first 
time with the classification of an ―accomplice‖ to the 
commission of a suicide attack that succeeded.  The court held 
that the behavioral element underlying the liability of an 
23
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accomplice to the offence of causing death deliberately is 
expressed by performing an act or making an omission, which 
is directed at enabling the principal perpetrator (the suicide 
terrorist) to commit the offence or assisting him to do so, inter 
alia, by providing tools or means to carry out the offence.  It 
has been held that the mental element required is intention to 
cause death with the concomitant intention that the offence of 
causing death (and not any offence) will be carried out by the 
principal perpetrator (the suicide terrorist).  Likewise, it has 
been held that it is not necessary for the accomplice to be 
aware of the details of the offence, rather it is sufficient that he 
is simply aware of its nature. 
It will be recalled that this case involved a defendant who 
was involved in a suicide attack primarily by preparing the 
lethal explosives vehicle in fulfillment of instructions that he 
had received to bring about a suicide attack.  The court held 
that the accused was an ―accomplice‖ based on the elements of 
liability discussed above.  Later, the court considered the issue 
of the sentence to be imposed on the defendant.  In this regard, 
the court held that as the defendant belonged to the inner 
circle of accomplices to the commission of the lethal suicide 
attack, in contrast to junior accomplices, he had to be treated in 
the same way as those liable for murder, and, accordingly, he 
was sentenced to a penalty of life imprisonment. 
In other words, in Ha’nini, classifying the defendant as an 
―accomplice‖ did not lead to a punitive result that was any 
different from what would have been achieved by classifying 
him as a ―principal perpetrator.‖  The outcome was different in 
A’amouri.70  That case concerned a defendant who was involved 
in a suicide attack carried out by means of a car bomb in the 
Megiddo junction in 2002.  In this attack, seventeen people 
were murdered and many others were injured.  The defendant 
had assisted his friends in Islamic Jihad to transport the 
devices needed to create the explosives in a bomb lab, 
purchased the car used for the suicide attack as well as its 
yellow registration plates, helped carry the containers of 
explosives from the bomb lab to the car, and even drove the car 
after it had been loaded with explosives. 
 
70. Appeals (JS) 101/03 A'amouri v. Military Prosecutor, [2004] 
(unpublished). 
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The Military Court of Appeal reiterated the principles of 
the Ha’nini ruling regarding the behavioral and mental 
elements required to find an ―accomplice‖ liable for an offence 
and even noted that the principal liability of an ―accomplice‖ 
stems from his willingness to assist in the commission of the 
offence, independent of whether the assistance is central or 
marginal and whether or not it would have been possible to 
commit the offence even without this assistance.  Against the 
background of these principles, it was held that as the accused 
was well aware of the fact that the car and the explosive 
containers loaded on it were intended for use in a suicide 
attack, there was no doubt that he intended not only to cause 
the deaths of others, but also intended that his acts would 
assist in the commission of the specific offence that was 
actually carried out, i.e., the suicide attack in the territory of 
Israel (even though he did not know its specific details).  He 
was, therefore, an ―accomplice‖ to the attack and its lethal 
outcome. 
When the court came to sentence the defendant, it noted 
that there was one accomplice whose liability was very near in 
gravity to that of the principal perpetrator, and, accordingly, 
the penalty of the two would be identical.  There was another 
accomplice whose liability was far removed in severity from 
that of the principal perpetrator, and, consequently, there was 
room to distinguish between their respective sentences.  In 
applying these principles the court stated that the latter 
defendant did not belong to the inner circle of the offence and it 
was unclear to what extent he regarded the offence as ―his 
offence.‖  His liability was, therefore, less severe, albeit only by 
a small measure, compared to the liability of a full accomplice, 
who was also involved in the preparatory stages of the offence 
and was aware of the details of its commission.  Accordingly, 
the court saw fit to impose on the accused a sentence of 
seventeen terms of life imprisonment (for his part in the 
attack); however, it ordered that they be run concurrently, and 
thereby negated a difference in principle (albeit not one in 
practice) between the penalty appropriate for that accused and 
the penalty appropriate (theoretically) for the direct 
perpetrator of the attack. 
Clearly, the different punitive outcomes of the two 
judgments did not stem from a fundamental shift in the nature 
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of the ruling, either in relation to the classification of liability 
or in relation to the appropriate penalty, but rather from the 
application of the ruling to the particular facts of the case.  
Both cases dealt with persons who were deemed, under the 
same tests, to be accomplices to the suicide attacks.  In Ha’nini, 
the accused was held to be a full accomplice to the attack and 
was therefore sentenced to the penalty fitting the principal 
perpetrator of the attack (had he stood on trial).  In contrast, 
A’amouri dealt with an accused who was not deemed to be a 
full accomplice, and he was, therefore, sentenced to a penalty 
that was different in principle.  It was held that the distinction 
between the two types of accomplices would depend on the 
extent of the accused‘s affiliation with the inner circle of the 
offence and the question of whether or not he saw the offence 
as his own. 
In the judgment in the Jundiyah case,71 the Military Court 
of Appeal referred to a different ―functionary‖ in the 
preparation of the suicide attack.  The accused was involved in 
a suicide attack in the Kiryat Menachem neighborhood in 
Jerusalem during 2002 in which eleven people were murdered 
and numerous others were injured.  The accused participated 
by establishing contact between the suicide terrorist and the 
dispatcher (at the time of making contact between the two, the 
accused was also brought up to date on the preparations for the 
attack).  In particular, the accused fitted the suicide terrorist 
with an explosives belt, which the latter subsequently used to 
carry out the lethal attack.  In these circumstances, using the 
tests applied in Ha’nini and A’amouri, it was held that the 
accused was an accomplice to the crime and belonged to the 
inner circle of accomplices.  Accordingly, he was sentenced to 
eleven cumulative terms of life imprisonment for his part in the 
offences relating to this attack. 
A de facto, albeit not de jure, shift in the definition of the 
term ―accomplice‖ took place in the case of Abu Saris.72  In Abu 
 
71. Appeals (JS) 2194/05 Jundiyah v. Military Prosecutor, [2005] 
(unpublished). 
72. Appeals (JS) 2003/05 Abu Saris v. Military Prosecutor, [2006] 
(unpublished).  This case involved a defendant who had been involved in a 
suicide attack that ended with the death of the suicide terrorist but did not 
lead to the deaths of others (and therefore we shall consider it further within 
the context of the discussion regarding suicide attacks that failed). 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/22
746 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
Saris, the Military Court of Appeal made a very important 
statement of principle that is relevant to the issue under 
consideration here.  In that judgment, the court held that an 
accused who did not regard the suicide attack as ―his offence,‖ 
and, therefore, did not belong to the inner circle of the 
offenders who actually executed the attack, would not be 
deemed to be an ―accomplice‖ to the offence.  In effect, Abu 
Saris narrowed—albeit not in a declarative fashion—the 
definition of an accomplice to an offence.  Now, a defendant 
who did not belong to the inner circle because he did not see 
the offence as his own would no longer be deemed an 
accomplice.  This is different from the result the court reached 
in A’amouri, in which it drew a distinction between full 
accomplices and junior accomplices.  Under Abu Saris, it 
appears as if the A’amouri distinction is no longer relevant.  
Instead, it seems like an accused must meet the following 
requirements before he will be considered an accomplice to a 
suicide attack: 
 
A.  The accused assisted in the commission of the 
suicide attack, even if the assistance was 
marginal and/or assistance without which the 
attack could still have been carried out; 
 
B.  The accused intended to cause the deaths of 
others, and also intended that his acts would 
assist in the commission of the suicide attack, 
even if he did not know the precise details of 
the attack; and 
 
C.  The accused regarded the suicide attack as 
his own offence and belonged to the inner 
circle of offenders. 
 
As a punitive consequence of this ruling, an accomplice to a 
suicide attack will, in principal, only be subject to the penalties 
imposed in Ha’nini and Jundiyah—cumulative sentences of life 
imprisonment equal to the number of people murdered in the 
attack.  The penalty imposed in A’amouri will no longer apply 
to accomplices because an A’amouri-type defendant will no 
longer be classified as an accomplice. 
27
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D. The Accessory 
 
As noted, when a successful suicide attack has taken place, 
the classification of ―principal perpetrator‖ will be assigned to 
the suicide terrorist alone.  Accordingly, when reference is to 
another ―jobholder‖ in the preparation or commission of a 
suicide attack, the other relevant classifications are 
―accomplice‖ and ―accessory.‖  An accused who is not deemed to 
be an ―accomplice‖ will almost certainly be regarded as an 
―accessory,‖ provided, of course, that he meets the threshold 
requirements of the latter category.  Clearly, these threshold 
requirements are broader than the threshold requirements of 
the category of ―accomplice,‖ as being an ―accessory‖ involves 
liability of a lesser degree. 
In the judgment in the Moukadi case,73 the Military Court 
of Appeal was required, for the first time, to consider the 
liability of an ―accessory‖ in relation to a successful suicide 
attack.  That case concerned an accused who was involved in a 
suicide attack carried out in 1994 on a No. 5 bus on Dizengoff 
Street in Tel Aviv.  Twenty-two people were murdered and 
many others were injured.  According to the factual findings of 
the Military Court of Appeal, the defendant‘s role included 
transporting the explosives used in preparing the lethal bomb, 
purchasing the bag in which the suicide terrorist carried the 
bomb, providing sleeping quarters for the terrorist on the night 
prior to the attack, transporting the terrorist on the day of the 
attack to the bus stop where he caught the bus taking him to 
Tel Aviv, and also delivering a tape recording to the news 
agency following the attack.  It was further held that the 
accused knew that the suicide attacker intended to carry out a 
suicide attack in Tel Aviv using the explosives that he carried 
in his bag (albeit this knowledge did not attach to all the 
components of the planned attack).  In addition, it was held 
that the accused intended, through the provision of his help, to 
bring about the lethal outcome that actually occurred. 
When referring to the classification of the defendant‘s 
liability, the Military Court of Appeal held that his liability 
 
73. Appeals (JS) 65/02 Moukadi v. Military Prosecutor, [2003] 
Judgments of Adm.Terr. 14(1) 159. 
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was that of an accessory.  The court did not directly explain 
this finding; however, a perusal of other parts of the judgment 
clarifies, to a certain extent, the reasons for the court‘s 
conclusion and perhaps even establishes a delimitation of the 
category of ―accessory‖ according to the judgment.  As part of 
the discussion regarding the penalty to be imposed on the 
defendant, the court held that not all accessories would be 
dealt with in an identical manner, as there were some 
accessories who were proximate in terms of gravity to the 
principal perpetrator and there were some who were far 
removed from him.  Under the facts of the case, a clear 
hierarchy of penalties had to be created between the accused 
and the principal perpetrators.  This was necessary in order for 
a distinction to be made between him and those who procured, 
labored, and toiled to actually execute the offence because the 
accused was not involved in the details of the plan and did not 
participate in its preliminary planning.  Concurrently, in the 
discussion of the mental element of the accused, it was held 
that it was insufficient to prove that he knew of the suicide 
terrorist‘s intention to carry out an attack in Tel Aviv and 
actually helped him.  Instead, to obtain a conviction, the court 
had to be persuaded that the defendant also intended to cause 
the lethal outcome through the assistance he provided (and 
this indeed was proved in the case of this defendant).  From 
these statements in the judgment, it is clear that the basic 
conditions for falling into the category of ―accessory‖ are the 
behavioral element of assistance in actually bringing about the 
suicide attack, the mental element of intent to cause the deaths 
of others, and the intent that, by his acts, the defendant would 
assist in the commission of the suicide attack, even if the 
defendant did not know the precise details of the attack. 
The judgment does not establish an unequivocal rule for 
determining the liability of an accessory who belongs to the 
inner circle versus an accessory who does not.  In other words, 
it is clear that the accused, who had satisfied the first two 
elements mentioned above, but did not belong to the inner 
circle of offenders, was an ―accessory,‖ albeit an accessory 
whose position was not proximate to that of the principal 
perpetrator.  Nonetheless, no unequivocal ruling was made 
regarding an accused who satisfied the first two elements and 
also belonged to the inner circle—was he an accessory whose 
29
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position was proximate to that of the principal perpetrator?  
And if not—what type of accessory could be said to be in a 
proximate position to the principal perpetrator? 
In effect, the first question was answered at a later stage 
in the above mentioned Abu Saris case, by virtue of the ruling 
that the accused was an ―accomplice.‖  Against this background 
it would appear that today the only distinction between an 
―accessory‖ and an ―accomplice‖ relates to whether or not the 
accused belongs to the inner circle, where the degree of 
proximity to the principal perpetrator will be a function of the 
intensity of the assistance.  It should be noted that in the 
judgment in the Moukadi case, not only was there a reference 
for the first time to the category of ―accessory,‖ but there was 
also a reference for the first time to the distinction between the 
various categories of Section 14(a) of the Order Regarding 
Rules of Liability for an Offence, a distinction which, it will be 
recalled, has merely punitive ramifications, if any.  In other 
words, this judgment preceded the rulings in Ha’nini and 
A’amouri and certainly the judgment in the matter of Abu 
Saris mentioned above, which delineated the category of 
―accomplice‖ relative to the category of ―accessory.‖  The 
judgment, in effect, dealt with the distinction, even if only in 
relation to the particular defendant whose case was being 
considered, between an ―accessory‖ and a ―principal 
perpetrator,‖ but not between an ―accessory‖ and an 
―accomplice.‖  It should also be noted that it even follows from 
the judgment that those who procured, labored, and toiled in 
order to bring about the suicide attack were in the nature of 
principal perpetrators, contrary to the approach that confined 
the category of ―principal perpetrators‖ to the suicide attacker 
himself who played a later role. 
As a result of the ruling that the position of the accused in 
the Moukadi case was not proximate to that of the principal 
perpetrator, the sentence imposed on that accused was not 
derived from the sentence fitting a principal perpetrator, 
namely, a life sentence for each of the persons murdered in the 
suicide attack.  Instead, the defendant was sentenced to a 
single term of life imprisonment.  As we shall see below, in a 
series of later judgments relating to defendants who were 
found to be accessories to suicide attacks (but whose positions 
did not rise to that of a principal perpetrator), the Military 
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Court of Appeal took a further significant step along the same 
course, by creating a real and not merely semantic distinction 
between the penalty imposed on these accessories to suicide 
attacks and the penalty appropriate for the principal 
perpetrators of these attacks, by imposing on the former a pre-
determined term of imprisonment.  We shall now turn to a 
review of the positions of these accessories, classified according 
to the mode of assistance given. 
 
1. The Transporter 
 
Initially, we shall consider an accessory who transports the 
suicide terrorist.  A number of acts of assistance may be 
considered in this connection, starting with the provision of 
escort and transport services from the point of departure, 
throughout the route and up to the scene of attack, and ending 
with the provision of aid to the suicide terrorist on a short 
segment of the route only.  In the Jaradath case,74 the accused 
transferred information to a person escorting the two terrorists 
regarding a way of entering the territory of the State of Israel 
in such a manner as to point to the particular route.  That 
same day the two terrorists carried out a ―no-escape‖ suicide 
attack in Afula, in which two people were murdered.  The 
Military Court of Appeal saw fit to impose a determinate 
sentence of twenty-five years actual imprisonment on the 
defendant, rather than a sentence of life imprisonment.  The 
main ground for this ruling was that the accessory‘s part in the 
attack was limited in that he only pointed to a possible way of 
entering the territory of the State of Israel. 
On the face of it, the judgment can be explained in terms of 
the special situation under consideration there.  Generally, the 
person responsible for transporting the suicide terrorist during 
most of the, or the entire, route to the site of the attack will 
belong to the inner circle, so he will not be deemed an 
―accessory,‖ but rather an ―accomplice,‖ and will therefore be 
sentenced to a penalty that consists of an indeterminate term 
of years.75  In the Jaradath case the accused was not a member 
 
74. Appeals (JS) 1886/05 Jaradath v. Military Prosecutor, [2005] 
(unpublished). 
75. See, e.g., Appeals (JS) 4/04 Abu Abid v. Military Prosecutor, [2004] 
(unpublished); Appeals (JS) 1322/05 Auis v. Military Prosecutor, [2006] 
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of the inner circle, and therefore, he was described as an 
―accessory.‖  Moreover, the assistance that he provided was 
momentary and for only a very specific, albeit important, 
segment of the journey.  It appears that had the accused 
provided an ―external service‖ to the members of the internal 
circle by way of transporting the suicide terrorist over all or 
most of the journey, i.e., had he been an ―accessory‖ (but one 
providing assistance of great significance), he would not have 
been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of years.  In any 
event, whereas in the Moukadi case, labeling the accused as an 
―accessory‖ whose position was not proximate to that of the 
principal perpetrator did not lead to the imposition of 
imprisonment for a term of years, but only to a semantic 
internal distinction within the category of indeterminate 
penalties, in the Jaradath case, a fixed term of years in prison 
was imposed on a person who was, in effect, an ―accessory‖—
and this is what gives this judgment its importance. 
 
2. The Intermediary 
 
A short time after the Jaradath case, the Military Court of 
Appeal considered the Madawi case.76  In Madawi, the court 
reached a similar punitive conclusion in relation to another 
―jobholder‖ in a suicide attack, namely, the intermediary 
between the suicide terrorist and the infrastructure 
dispatching him to execute the attack.  An ―intermediary‖ is 
one who makes the initial contact between someone who is 
interested in carrying out a suicide attack and a terrorist 
infrastructure that is interested in a suicide terrorist carrying 
out a suicide attack.  The intermediary‘s services can be 
provided upon the suicide terrorist‘s request to locate people 
who will help him fulfill his plan, or at the request of 
operatives in terrorist organizations who are seeking a suicide 
terrorist.  In any event, the intermediary performs his task and 
with that concludes his role in terms of the attack; only 
afterwards will the plan be put into effect. 
The Madawi case dealt with an accused who had been 
 
(unpublished).  It should be noted that the latter judgment concerned the 
same person as had escorted the terrorists in the Jaradath case. 
76. Appeals (JS) 2040/05 Madawi v. Military Prosecutor and Counter 
Appeal, [2005] (unpublished). 
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asked to help commit an attack that was ultimately executed 
by the suicide terrorist in Kiryat Yuvel (in which, as 
mentioned, eleven people were murdered).  Consequently, the 
accused approached a member of the infrastructure which 
eventually brought about the lethal attack and informed him of 
the wishes of the suicide terrorist.  The Military Court of 
Appeal in effect regarded the accused as an ―accessory‖ and 
imposed a sentence of twenty-five years actual imprisonment. 
The Military Court of Appeal again reached a similar 
conclusion in the Kamamagi case.77  That case dealt with an 
accused who was involved in a suicide attack carried out in the 
Amakim Mall in Afula, in which three people were murdered 
and dozens were injured.  The accused‘s part in the attack took 
the form of mediating between an operative who was in contact 
with the female suicide terrorist on one hand and military 
operatives of the Islamic Jihad, who eventually dispatched her 
to perform the attack, on the other hand.  The court held that 
the accused was liable as an ―accessory‖ (also in accordance 
with the agreement of the parties), and a sentence of twenty-
five years imprisonment was imposed on him. 
 
3. The Cameraman 
 
Fixed terms of imprisonment were also imposed on 
―accessories‖ to suicide attacks who had the function of filming 
the suicide terrorists.  As is well-known, terrorist attacks in 
general, and suicide attacks in particular, have a clear 
propaganda aspect.  Accordingly, prior to many suicide attacks, 
the prospective suicide terrorist is filmed with a video camera, 
usually while uttering warlike declarations.  Following the 
attack, this video tape is passed to the news media and is 
televised.  The position of an accused who took part in such an 
abysmal production was first considered by the Military Court 
of Appeal in the Sha’ablu case.78 
That case concerned an accused who transported two 
prospective suicide terrorists on two separate occasions to film 
 
77. Appeals (JS) 2823/05 Kamamagi v. Military Prosecutor, [2006] 
(unpublished). 
78. Appeals (JS) 1125/04 Sha'ablu v. Military Prosecutor and Counter 
Appeal, [2005] (unpublished). 
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these types of videos.  In both instances, the videos were made 
on the evening before the terrorist departed for the planned 
suicide attack; both times the filming was carried out in the 
presence of the accused.  On one occasion, the person being 
filmed left to carry out the suicide attack but changed his mind 
and returned.  In the second case, the person being filmed 
reached the entry point into Israel.  Soldiers, however, 
suspected him of being a terrorist, fired at him, and, as a 
result, the explosives belt worn by him detonated, killing three 
civilians and injuring others.  It should be noted in relation to 
the first incident that at the time of transporting the terrorist 
to the place where the film was made, the accused did not know 
that his passenger was a potential suicide terrorist, but he did 
know that this was a person involved in prohibited activities. 
The Military Court of Appeal upheld the finding of the 
court of first instance regarding the liability of the accused for 
the offences of deliberately causing death and attempting to 
deliberately cause death, in accordance with the category of 
―accessory,‖ and imposed a sentence of twenty-five years actual 
imprisonment.  In this case, the assistance was of a low level 
compared to the two types of accessories considered previously, 
and, therefore, it would appear that had the accused been 
convicted exclusively for his involvement in the attack which 
succeeded (like the accessories in the above judgments in the 
Jaradath case on one hand and the Kamamagi case on the 
other), his punishment would have been even lighter than that 
actually imposed on him. 
The Military Court of Appeal reached a similar result in 
the Daruza case.79  In that case, the accused acted together 
with the Sha‘ablu in both of the incidents described.  On each 
occasion he organized the transportation of the potential 
suicide terrorist by Sha‘ablu to his (the accused‘s) mother‘s flat, 
where the filming took place.  In relation to the attack that 
succeeded, he even delivered the resulting video tape to the 
television stations.  This accused was convicted of the same 
offences as Sha‘ablu, also as an ―accessory,‖ and he too was 
given a sentence of twenty-five years actual imprisonment. 
It follows that when an accused is convicted as an 
 
79. Appeals (JS) 1369 + 1375/05 Daruza v. Military Prosecutor and 
Counter Appeal, [2005] (unpublished). 
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss2/22
754 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:2 
―accessory‖ to a successful suicide attack, and the significance 
of the assistance is not such as to make his acts similar to the 
acts of the principal perpetrator, the Military Court of Appeal 
will deviate from the rule under which it would impose a 
sentence of life imprisonment upon the person convicted of the 
offence (or offences) of causing death deliberately, and instead 
will impose a sentence of a term of years, albeit for a lengthy 
period of time.  This, in effect, was the only type of case in 
which a sentence of life imprisonment was not imposed on an 
accused involved in a suicide attack which succeeded. 
 
E. The Instigator 
 
In cases of suicide attacks, it is very difficult to identify a 
situation where only ―procurement‖ has taken place.  This is 
because the ideological background on one hand, and the 
complexity of the attack on the other hand, result in most of 
the cases involving figures who go far beyond mere 
procurement, and the instigator of the attack will generally 
perform additional tasks, which will make him liable for the 
attack in the capacity of an ―accomplice‖ to the offence.  Indeed, 
it has often happened that an officer in a terrorist hierarchy 
orders his subordinate to commit an attack.  Generally, 
however, the person giving the order will quickly become 
involved in the concrete planning of the attack or will supply 
the means to carry it out—usually in the form of weapons or 
money.  As such, that person will be considered an ―accomplice‖ 
to the offence.80 
Accordingly, one may ask what punitive considerations 
will apply in the case of a mere ―instigator‖ of a suicide attack 
that succeeds.81  Conceivably, the instigator may be likened to 
 
80. See, e.g., Samaria Court 7227/02 Military Prosecutor v. Abu el Hijah, 
[2005] (unpublished); Samaria Court 6431/03 Military Prosecutor v. Chatab, 
[2005] (unpublished); Samaria Court 7449/03 Military Prosecutor v. Ahmed 
Basha'rath, [2005] (unpublished).  See also CrimA (XX) 2796/95 Anon. v. 
Israel, 51 [1997] P.D. 388(3).  Cf. the majority opinions in CrFH (XX) 1294/96 
Meshulam v. Israel, 52 [1998] P.D. 1(5) and SCrF (TA) 1158/02 Israel v. 
Barghouti, [2004] Takdin Mehozi 3430(2) (referring to liability as a ―joint 
perpetrator‖ under the Israeli Penal Law). 
81. One of the general objectives of punishment is deterrence.  See, e.g., 
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the 
Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 
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an intermediary between the suicide attacker and the 
infrastructure, in the sense that both form a link in the 
chronology of the attack, but depart from the scene at one of 
the initial stages.  Conversely, it can be argued that because of 
the initiative component, it is appropriate to distinguish the 
instigator from the intermediary (who responds to another‘s 
initiative—either the suicide terrorist‘s or the infrastructure‘s) 
and equate him rather to the accomplices to the offence in the 
sense that even though he does not belong to the inner circle, 
he is the compass who draws this circle.  We should also recall 
that in the Moukadi case mentioned above, the accused was 
distinguished from those who ―initiated, toiled and labored to 
bring about the attack,‖82 and this perhaps allows us to 
understand the view of the Military Court of Appeal to the 
effect that the instigator resides on the same level of gravity as 
the planners of the attack and those who carry it out.83 
Immediately prior to the conclusion of this Article, a 
judgment was given regarding a rare case where a person at 
the top of the hierarchy in a terrorist organization confined 
himself ―merely‖ to procuring persons to commit an attack.  
Indeed, the suicide attack failed, but it is possible to draw 
analogies from the judgment in relation to situations of 
procurement regarding a successful suicide attack.  The 
judgment was given in the case of Abu Hamdiya.84  That case 
concerned a defendant who ordered another to recruit people to 
take part in attacks within the framework of the Hamas 
organization.  When that other person informed the defendant 
that a volunteer had been found to commit a suicide attack, the 
defendant authorized the plan, instructed the other person to 
proceed with the preparations, and asked him to remain in 
contact so that the defendant could take responsibility for the 
 
GEO. L.J. 949 (2003).  See also Kevin M. Carlsmith, John M. Darley & Paul H. 
Robinson, Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for 
Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284 (2002). 
82. Appeals (JS) 65/02 Moukadi v. Military Prosecutor, [2003] 
Judgments of Adm.Terr. 14(1) 159. 
83. For a discussion on the liability of the instigator, which is similar to 
the liability of the primary perpetrator and perhaps even supersedes it, see 
CrimA (XX) 2796/95 Anon. v. Israel, 51 [1997] P.D. 388(3) 404; KEDMI, supra 
note 55, at 374. 
84. Appeals (JS) 3333/05 Abu Hamdiya v. Military Prosecutor and 
Counter Appeal, [2007] (unpublished). 
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attack following its execution.  Subsequently, the defendant 
also received reports regarding the progress of the preparations 
but did not involve himself in the planning and preparations.  
Ultimately, the prospective suicide terrorist was dispatched to 
commit the attack but retracted and returned.  The court held 
that the accused had committed the offence of attempting to 
cause death deliberately as an ―instigator‖ and imposed on him 
a sentence of life imprisonment.  Clearly, it is possible to draw 
conclusions from the penal outcome of this judgment regarding 
the sentence that would have been imposed had the offence 
been one of procuring a suicide attack that succeeded.  In other 
words, if a person procuring a suicide attack which failed was 
sentenced to life imprisonment, a fortiori, this is the sentence 
that would have been imposed had the suicide attack in fact 
succeeded.  Put differently, it seems clear that, according to the 
case law, the position of a person ―procuring‖ a suicide attack 
that succeeds is equivalent to the position of an ―accomplice‖ to 
this offence.85 
 
IV. Suicide Attacks that Fail 
 
A. Background 
 
As noted, where there is a suicide attack that happily does 
 
85. If a leader of a terrorist organization deliberately distances himself 
from involvement in attacks, he then sometimes cannot be convicted as an 
―accessory‖ or instigator.  See SCrF (TA) 1158/02 Israel v. Barghouti, [2004] 
Takdin Mehozi 3430(2) ¶ 172 (explaining that ―it is not possible to convict a 
person in Israel of the general offence of aiding an act of murder, and it is 
also not possible to convict him of the general offence of procuring an act of 
murder.  In the same way as the aid must refer to a specific offence with a 
concrete goal, so too must the procurement be between one individual and 
another, and refer to solicitation to commit a specific offence with a concrete 
goal.‖).  Still, he may be convicted of the offence of holding a position in a 
prohibited organization, in accordance with Regulation 85(1)(b) of the 
Emergency Defence Regulations of 1945, which carries a maximum penalty of 
ten years imprisonment.  See SCrF (TA) 1158/02 Israel v. Barghouti, [2004] 
Takdin Mehozi 3430(2) ¶ 139-40, 179 (where the accused was convicted, inter 
alia, of activities in a terrorist organization—an offence which carries a term 
of imprisonment of up to twenty years); Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 
5708–1948, sec. 2.  Currently, under Israeli law it is possible to convict a 
person accused of heading a criminal organization whose activities include 
the offences of murder, and impose a sentence of twenty years imprisonment 
on him.  See Combating Criminal Organizations Law, 5773-2003, sec. 2. 
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not result in the death of others, regardless of whether it ends 
with the death of the suicide terrorist, the relevant offence is 
attempt to cause death deliberately.  The general offence of an 
attempt to commit an offence is defined in Sections 19 and 20 
of the Order Regarding Rules of Liability for an Offence, which 
provide as follows: 
 
Section 19 of the Order Regarding Rules of 
Liability for an Offence: 
 
Save if otherwise provided or implied in statute, 
any law applicable to the commission of the 
completed offence shall also apply to an attempt 
to commit it. 
 
Section 20 of the Order Regarding Rules of 
Liability for an Offence: 
 
A.  A person is deemed to attempt to commit an 
offence when he begins to put his intention to 
commit it into effect by some overt act and by 
means adapted to achieve such intention, but 
does not achieve such intention to such an 
extent as to commit the offence. 
 
B.  It is immaterial, except as regards to 
punishment, whether the offender does all 
that is necessary on his part to complete the 
commission of the offence or whether the 
complete commission thereof is prevented by 
circumstances independent of his will or 
whether he desists of his own motion from 
further prosecution of his intention. 
 
C.  It is immaterial that by reason of 
circumstances not known to the offender it is 
impossible in fact to commit the offence. 
 
D.  A provision which sets out a mandatory 
penalty for an offence or a minimum penalty 
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for an offence will not apply to an attempt to 
commit it. 
 
 Delineating the general offence of ―attempt‖ exceeds the 
scope of this Article, however, in brief, it should be noted that 
there is no substantive difference between this delineation in 
the law applied by the military courts in Judea and Samaria 
and that prevailing in Israeli law.  In contrast, a difference 
does exist between the two systems of law in relation to the 
maximum penalty.  Whereas in Israeli law the maximum 
penalty imposed on a person attempting to commit the offence 
of murder is twenty years imprisonment,86 according to the law 
applied in the military courts, the maximum penalty in the 
case of an attempt to cause death deliberately is the same as 
the penalty imposed for the completed offence—that is life 
imprisonment (theoretically, the death penalty could be 
imposed; however, it will be recalled that this is a penalty that 
is not imposed in practice).87 
It is also important to recall the former language of Section 
19 of the Order Regarding Rules of Liability for an Offence, 
which provided for the penalty to be imposed in the case of an 
attempt to commit an offence.  This was language that was in 
force until June 2005 and that gave rise to judgments of 
principle that are important to cite.  This language stated as 
follows: 
 
A person who attempts to commit an offence 
shall unless some other punishment is provided 
by law or security legislation be liable – 
 
(1)  to imprisonment for life if the offence which 
he tried to commit is one which a person 
committing can expect, upon conviction, to be 
punished by death; 
 
(2)  to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten 
years - if the offence which he tried to commit 
is one which a person committing can expect 
 
86. See Paras. 25, 27, 34D, 41, 300 and 305 of the Penal Law. 
87. See generally Ben Haim, supra note 57. 
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to be punished by life imprisonment; 
 
(3)  in every other case, to half the maximum 
punishment which a person committing the 
offence could expect to receive upon being 
convicted of the offence.88 
 
In any event, both before and after the amendment, the 
courts treated the maximum penalty for the offence of attempt 
to cause death deliberately—life imprisonment—as an 
exception to the general rule of imposing imprisonment for a 
fixed term of years.  This was similar to the approach taken 
towards every other offence, where only in exceptional 
circumstances would the maximum prescribed penalty be 
imposed.  As we shall see below, in certain cases of liability for 
suicide attacks that failed, the maximum penalty of life 
imprisonment was in fact imposed.  This sentence was imposed 
notwithstanding the two aspects that made it exceptional—
first, the very imposition of the maximum penalty, and second, 
the very imposition of a life sentence on a person who did not 
cause the death of another.  As we shall see below, the factors 
weighed by the courts when deciding whether to impose a fixed 
term of imprisonment or the exceptional penalty of life 
imprisonment were more varied than the factors courts 
weighed when deciding the same issue for those involved in a 
successful suicide attack.  Thus, for example, reference was 
made not only to the function of the accused in the attack, but 
also to other issues, such as the extent to which the accused 
performed his part and how close the attack actually came to 
fruition. 
An additional important aspect of suicide attacks that do 
not succeed is that the classification of ―principal perpetrator,‖ 
which is reserved for the direct perpetrator of the attack, 
remains more than merely theoretical, as generally, the 
prospective direct perpetrator of the attack remains alive.  In 
addition it is worth noting the variation that occurs when the 
court does not impose the exceptional penalty of life 
imprisonment, but rather imposes a sentence of a term of 
 
88. Following the amendment of Section 19, subsection D was inserted 
in Section 20 of the Order Regarding Rules of Liability for an Offence. 
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years, in contrast to the situation where the suicide attack has 
succeeded.  Thus, whereas in relation to a suicide attack which 
has succeeded, even if the court has imposed a determinate 
sentence it will usually be expressed in a lengthy term of about 
twenty-five years actual imprisonment; in the case of a suicide 
attack that does not succeed, however, a shorter, and 
sometimes even significantly shorter, category of determinate 
sentences is available. 
In the following section of the Article, we shall try and 
delineate the categories of penalties that were established by 
the case law regarding persons charged with attempting to 
cause death deliberately by means of a suicide attack, and 
thereby illustrate the punitive considerations guiding the 
courts in the difficult task of deciding which sentence to impose 
for this offence. 
 
B. Restrictions on Powers of Sentencing 
 
As we can see from the above discussion, when the 
maximum penalty for the offence of attempting to cause death 
deliberately is equivalent to the maximum penalty for the 
completed offence, there is no restriction on the power to 
sentence a person convicted of the former offence.  However, 
the situation was different under the prevailing law prior to 
June 2005.  Thus, under the former language of Section 19 of 
the Order Regarding Rules of Liability for an Offence a court 
was entitled to impose the maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment on a person attempting to commit an offence, 
which had he committed, would have carried with it the death 
penalty.  In contrast, when the defendant was someone who 
had tried to commit an offence that, had he committed it, would 
have carried a sentence of life imprisonment, the restrictions 
on the power of sentencing confined the ensuing sentence to ten 
years imprisonment. 
Prima facie, as the maximum penalty for the completed 
offence of causing death deliberately is the death penalty, it 
follows that the maximum penalty for attempting to cause 
death deliberately, including involvement in an attempt to 
carry out a suicide attack, is life imprisonment.  The courts 
have, however, dealt with situations of attempts to carry out 
suicide attacks where it has been questioned whether the 
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defendant could have expected to be sentenced to the death 
penalty had he completed the offence because a negative 
answer would result in a restriction on the power to sentence 
him for the offence of attempting to cause death deliberately. 
This fundamental question arose in the Kaudasi case.89  
That case concerned a 15-year-old youth who tried to penetrate 
the heart of the State of Israel in order to carry out a suicide 
attack with the aid of an explosives belt strapped to his body.  
This attack failed as the accused was stopped by soldiers on the 
seam line between the sovereign territory of the state and 
Judea and Samaria.  The accused, who apparently realized 
that he had been spotted, attempted to detonate the explosives 
and blow himself up in order to injure the soldiers, but failed in 
this as well.  The Military Court of Appeal examined the 
penalty that the accused could theoretically have anticipated 
had he committed the completed offence of causing death 
deliberately.  Section 51 of the Order Regarding Security 
Regulations, which it will be recalled is the legislation 
providing for this offence, states in the second paragraph that 
if, at the time of committing the offence, the accused was less 
than 18 years of age, he shall not be sentenced to the death 
penalty.  Accordingly, the court held that an accused minor 
convicted of the offence of attempting to cause death 
deliberately could not be deemed to have expected his offence, 
had it been completed, to carry the death penalty.  Thus, such a 
minor was subject to a restricted sentence of ten years 
imprisonment.  The accused was, therefore, sentenced to only 
ten years actual imprisonment for the offence of attempting to 
cause death deliberately, even though he was very close to 
committing a lethal suicide attack.  It should be noted that the 
ultimate punishment of the accused was higher, as he was also 
convicted of other offences. 
The Kaudasi ruling led to numerous other judgments with 
similar outcomes.  The reason for this is that the phenomenon 
of minors being involved in the commission or attempted 
commission of suicide attacks, usually as the actual or 
potential direct perpetrators, is regrettably and shockingly not 
at all unusual.  This legal outcome, which all would probably 
 
89. Appeals (JS) 128/02 Kaudasi v. Military Prosecutor 13 Judgments of 
Adm.Terr. 164 (2002). 
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agree is undesirable, led ultimately to the amendment of 
Section 19 of the Order Regarding Rules of Liability for an 
Offence, as explained above, and thus the Kaudasi ruling 
lapsed. 
Prior to the amendment of Section 19, an attempt was 
made to expand the Kaudasi ruling in other directions.  This 
was the case, for example, in Sourakagi,90 which also dealt 
with the situation of a suicide terrorist, this time an adult, who 
attempted to detonate an explosives belt inside a bus, and who 
luckily also failed to accomplish his plan by reason of a 
technical malfunction and his subsequent arrest.  In that case, 
it was argued that the accused could not be treated as someone 
who would have been subject to the death penalty had he 
committed the completed offence of causing death deliberately 
because the panel that had heard the case at first instance was 
not empowered to impose the death penalty (because it did not 
comprise three officers of the rank of lieutenant colonel).91  
Therefore, under the rationale in Kaudasi, as the defendant 
had been convicted of an attempt to cause death deliberately, 
he should not have been sentenced to a penalty exceeding ten 
years imprisonment.  The Military Court of Appeal rejected 
this argument and held that the issue of the expected penalty 
for a completed offence was determined in light of two factors—
the offence and the perpetrator.  Incidental and theoretical 
factors, such as the composition of the bench that would have 
heard the case had it involved a completed offence could not be 
taken into account.  Accordingly, it was held that, in this case, 
there was no restriction on the power to impose sentence and, 
in principle, it was possible to impose a sentence of life 
imprisonment. 
To summarize, the Kaudasi ruling was left confined solely 
to the case of a minor committing the offence of attempting to 
cause death deliberately.  This ruling was valid in relation to 
the old language of Section 19 of the Order Regarding the Rules 
of Liability for an Offence, but lapsed with the amendment to 
the section, so that today there is no restriction on the power to 
 
90. Appeals (JS) 303/03 Sourakagi v. Military Prosecutor, [2004] 
(unpublished). 
91. Order Regarding Security Regulations (JS) (no. 378) 1970, S.H. § 
47(a)(8). 
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sentence for the offence of attempting to cause death 
deliberately.  Having examined the question of the power to 
impose punishment for the offence of attempting to cause death 
deliberately, we shall now turn to the use made of this power in 
relation to the different ―jobholders‖ in a suicide attack which 
has failed. 
 
C. The Prospective Suicide Terrorist 
 
First, we shall consider the central figure in every planned 
suicide attack—the prospective suicide terrorist.  In contrast to 
a suicide attack that has succeeded, where this figure is no 
longer alive (except in the case of a ―no-escape attack‖ which 
has not ended with his death), in a failed suicide attack, this 
figure always survives (except in cases of a suicide terrorist 
who blows himself up but does not ―succeed‖ in killing others in 
the process). 
When one examines the case law that deals with these 
situations, it becomes apparent that the principal consideration 
affecting the penalty imposed on the potential suicide terrorist 
is to what extent the accused acted to fulfill his part of the 
mission, whereas the degree to which the attack almost 
reached fruition is a consideration of only secondary force.  
This is, of course, only the case when the court is free of 
restrictions on the power of sentencing introduced by the above 
Kaudasi ruling.  In mathematical terms, it is possible to say 
that the sentence is a function of two variables—the variable 
which relates to the extent to which the accused has completed 
his part and the variable which relates to the proximity of the 
attack to fruition.  The first variable is of key influence on the 
value of the function whereas the second variable possesses 
merely secondary influence.  Below we shall examine a number 
of potential situations, with reference to the above variables, 
and we shall consider the penalties ultimately imposed in cases 
falling within these categories. 
The first type of case we shall consider concerns a 
prospective suicide terrorist who does everything possible to 
carry out the planned attack, and only a hairsbreadth stands 
between him and the success of his mission.  The Sourakagi 
case is an example of this situation—a suicide terrorist who 
tried to blow himself up inside a bus but failed only because of 
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a technical malfunction in the explosives and his subsequent 
arrest.  In that case, after the court rejected the argument that 
it was restricted in its power of sentencing, it sentenced the 
accused to life imprisonment. 
Another type of case involves a prospective suicide 
terrorist who does everything he can to execute a planned 
attack, but fails because the attack is foiled before the terrorist 
reaches the planned site of execution.  An example of this is the 
Tubasi case.92  The accused in that case was dispatched to 
execute a suicide attack in the ―City Hall‖ club in Haifa.  The 
accused succeeded in entering the territory of the State of 
Israel but was arrested near the seam line with the explosives 
beside him in his vehicle.  Here, too, the accused was sentenced 
to life imprisonment.  In the Bushkar and Ramadan case,93 
however, an apparently contradictory punitive outcome was 
produced.  The latter case concerned a potential suicide 
terrorist and his transporter who departed to execute a 
planned attack in Tel Aviv.  The two succeeded in entering the 
State of Israel but were arrested near the seam line.  Prima 
facie, this case was identical to that of Tubasi, although, 
ultimately, a sentence of life imprisonment was not imposed—
the defendants received a sentence of twenty years actual 
imprisonment.  In imposing this sentence, the court explained 
that the test of proximity to completing the attack is not 
geographical; rather, it refers to the scope of the additional acts 
needed in order to implement the planned attack.  In that case 
the defendants were caught prior to being equipped with 
explosive belts, which awaited them in a concealed place close 
to the planned site of the attack, and, therefore, the court did 
not see fit to impose the maximum penalty on them.  Instead, 
the court chose to impose a determinate sentence, albeit one 
entailing a heavy term of imprisonment. 
The next type of case deals with the situation where a 
hairsbreadth separates the potential suicide terrorist from the 
realization of his plan, but where he has not done everything 
possible to implement that plan.  An illustration of this is the 
 
92. Appeals (JS) 133/03 Tubasi v. Military Prosecutor, [2004] 
(unpublished). 
93. Appeals (JS) 311 + 318 + 314 + 317/03 Bushkar and Ramadan v. 
Military Prosecutor and Counter Appeal, [2004] (unpublished). 
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Shalchati case.94  The suicide attack planned there was in two 
parts.  One suicide terrorist was supposed to blow himself up 
and immediately afterwards, the second terrorist was supposed 
to fire an automatic weapon in all directions.  The attack was 
planned to take place at the central bus station in Tel Aviv.  
Ultimately, only the first part of the attack was carried out, 
injuring a number of civilians.  The accused, who was the 
prospective second suicide terrorist, threw away his weapon 
and ran from the scene.  The court at first instance imposed a 
sentence of life imprisonment on the accused, but the Military 
Court of Appeal replaced this sentence with a lengthy prison 
term of thirty years actual imprisonment.  In this way the 
court acknowledged, on the one hand, that the attack had led to 
injury to others and only as an accident of fate failed to lead to 
any deaths, while, on the other hand, also recognized that the 
accused, at the last critical moment, chose not to carry out his 
part of the attack, thereby preventing a more serious result 
from occurring. 
Another rare case is where a hairsbreadth separates the 
potential suicide terrorist from the realization of his goal, but 
where the attack is prevented because he fully retracts.  This 
occurred in the Tauwalbah case.95  There, the accused, acting 
under the malevolent and persistent influence of his older 
brother, a senior terrorist in the Islamic Jihad, reached Haifa 
in order to execute a suicide attack using an explosives belt 
strapped to his body.  The accused was at the point of 
detonating the explosives belt near a crowd of people on two 
occasions, but each time—a moment before he was to pull the 
switch—he retracted.  Afterwards, the accused also removed 
the explosives belt and left it in an abandoned building with 
the detonator detached and inoperative.  The Military Court of 
Appeal regarded the acts of the accused as expressing complete 
withdrawal from his plan.  Moreover, the court took into 
account the fact that the willingness of the accused to proceed 
was, from the beginning, only the result of the persistent, ill-
fated pressure exerted by his brother.  The court, therefore, 
imposed on him a lenient sentence of seven years actual 
 
94. Appeals (JS) 304/03 Shalchati v. Military Prosecutor, [2004] 
(unpublished). 
95. Appeals (JS) 225/02 Tauwalbah v. Military Prosecutor, [2004] 
Judgments of Adm.Terr. 14(1) 319. 
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imprisonment.  In this case, the court also took the highly 
unusual step of rejecting the plea bargain submitted to it 
(under which the court was asked to impose a sentence of 
eleven years actual imprisonment on the accused) on the 
ground that it was excessively harsh. 
There is good reason for the huge discrepancy between the 
two cases just described.  Indeed, both defendants refrained at 
the last moment from executing their part of the plan, thereby 
not killing themselves or others.  However, whereas in the first 
case the defendant was involved in an attack that was carried 
out in part, and only by a miracle did not end in the deaths of 
others but ―only‖ in their injury, in the second case, the attack 
did not take place at all.  Moreover, in the second case, the 
court concluded that there had been complete repentance, a 
rare occurrence in relation to someone who had already gone 
out to execute a suicide attack, whereas in the first case the 
court did not reach a similar conclusion. 
The last type of case concerns a suicide terrorist who goes 
out to execute an attack, retreats before implementing the 
plan, usually because of the presence of the security forces, but 
does not abandon his original intention to carry out the attack 
and, in effect, fails to make good on this intention because of 
his subsequent arrest.  This category—failure of the attack as a 
result of the arrest of the potential suicide terrorist after he 
has postponed the attack for tactical reasons—is an 
intermediate case between the extreme situations of failure of 
the attack as a result of the full repentance of the potential 
suicide terrorist and failure of the attack merely because of the 
arrest of the potential suicide terrorist en route to the planned 
attack.  Accordingly, a standard of punishment of twenty years 
actual imprisonment—or even a little more—has been set for 
this class of circumstances, placing it in the range between the 
levels of punishment in the two extremes described above.  
This was the situation in the cases of Sa’id96 and Jauwad 
respectively.97  Both cases concerned a suicide terrorist who 
had made his way to execute a suicide attack in the Sharon 
area, but retraced his footsteps near the seam line because of 
 
96. Appeals (JS) 1650/04 Military Prosecutor v. Sa'id, [2004] 
(unpublished). 
97. Appeals (JS) 1917/04 Jauwad v. Military Prosecutor, [2004] 
(unpublished). 
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the presence of the security forces, and, at a certain later stage, 
was arrested.  In the second case, a sentence was imposed in 
accordance with the above standard of punishment with the 
court even taking the unusual step of rejecting a plea bargain, 
which sought to impose fifteen years actual imprisonment on 
the defendant, on the ground that it was overly lenient. 
This review of the types of situations that arise points to 
the fact that the primary factor weighing on the punitive 
outcome relates to the question of the lengths to which the 
potential suicide terrorist has gone to fulfill his part in the 
scheme, whereas, on occasion, the secondary factor of the 
proximity of the attack to fruition also carries weight.  In the 
case law, implementation of the primary consideration needed 
for the full action generally led to a sentence of life 
imprisonment, an action which was partial by virtue of full 
repentance led to a sentence of seven years actual 
imprisonment, and an action which was partial for tactical 
reasons led to a sentence of twenty years actual imprisonment 
and a little more.  So great was the impact of this consideration 
that in one case partial implementation of the attack did not 
lead to a sentence of life imprisonment, in view of the non-
fulfillment on the part of the accused.  The secondary 
consideration influenced the penalty in a situation where there 
was an absence of the determinative component of the 
proximity to fruition because the accused had not yet equipped 
himself with the destructive implements.  In that case, the 
secondary consideration led to a more lenient sentence so that 
instead of the sentence of life imprisonment generally imposed 
on someone acting to fulfill his part, a sentence of twenty years 
actual imprisonment was imposed.  Naturally, these penalties 
were imposed in cases where the court was not restricted in its 
sentencing power, since such restrictions, when applicable, 
dictate the punitive outcome. 
Having examined the sentencing considerations and the 
punitive consequences in relation to the principal ―functionary‖ 
in a failed suicide attack, namely, the potential suicide 
terrorist, the time has come to examine these factors in relation 
to other ―functionaries‖ in the suicide attack.  Ultimately, the 
position of each ―functionary‖ will be compared to that of the 
potential suicide terrorist in similar circumstances. 
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D. The Dispatcher 
 
The ―jobholder‖ we shall turn to next is the dispatcher of 
the suicide terrorist.  As we shall see below, the case law has 
not confined this category to the person who is the driving force 
behind the ―production‖ of the planned attack.  The leading 
judgment in this matter was produced in the case of Atzam 
Jerar.98  That case concerned a defendant who was convicted of, 
inter alia, involvement in a suicide attack that failed because 
the two potential suicide attackers retraced their steps in the 
area of the seam line after encountering the increased presence 
of the security forces.  The involvement of the defendant in the 
attack primarily took the form of helping to prepare the 
explosive belts, filming the two suicide terrorists with a video 
camera for familiar propaganda purposes, and helping to 
transfer the explosive belts to the terrorists, all while he was 
aware of the details of the planned attack. 
The Military Court of Appeal regarded the accused as a 
full accomplice to the offence in view of the fact that he was a 
member of the inner circle of the offence, and accordingly, saw 
him as one of the dispatchers of the suicide attackers.  
Referring to the legal position of the dispatcher, the court held 
that events taking place after the potential suicide attacker 
had departed for his mission were irrelevant.  This was because 
by dispatching the suicide terrorist the dispatcher had done 
everything possible in order to achieve the lethal outcome, 
similar to a person pressing on the trigger of a firearm.  The 
court further noted that the legal position of a dispatcher 
should be even more serious than that of the suicide terrorist 
himself for two reasons.  First, a person wishing to take his 
own life cannot be deterred by the threat of punishment should 
he fail, whereas this is not true of his dispatcher who is not 
willing to lose his life, and therefore, can be subjected to a 
deterrent punishment.  Second, the dispatcher is more 
dangerous.  Whereas the suicide terrorist performs his mission 
and dies, the dispatcher continues to act and seeks to bring 
about additional attacks. 
In view of these principles, the court imposed a sentence of 
 
98. Appeals (JS) 183 + 190/03 Military Prosecutor v. Atzam Jerar and 
Counter Appeal, [2004] (unpublished). 
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life imprisonment on this defendant, even though the planned 
attack was not carried out and the potential suicide attackers 
retreated prior to infiltrating the sovereign territory of the 
State of Israel.  Moreover, the suicide attackers, including 
Jauwad—mentioned above in the category of potential suicide 
attackers—were not given a sentence of life imprisonment.99  In 
contrast, the Atzam Jerar judgment placed an emphasis on the 
accused fulfilling his role completely; therefore, the fact that 
the desired lethal outcome did not ensue did not act in his 
favor, whereas in relation to the potential suicide attackers, 
this fact did act in their favor, as the failure was the result of 
their decision, albeit for tactical reasons only.  In this way, the 
court gave effect to its approach that, on occasion, the 
dispatcher‘s sentence will be harsher than that of the potential 
suicide terrorist himself.  In this connection it is also important 
to emphasize that Jauwad was not the ―driving force‖ behind 
the attempted attack, but was the ―second fiddle‖ and perhaps 
even ―third fiddle‖ in that event.  Yet, the Military Court of 
Appeal regarded the inner circle of the offence as the 
geometrical place for the category of dispatcher of the suicide 
attacker, and accordingly held, as a matter of principle, that all 
the members of this circle deserved a sentence of life 
imprisonment, including the defendant. 
Not long afterwards the Military Court of Appeal heard the 
case of an additional participant in the same event, Mahmed 
Jerar.100  The accused, a family member of the previous 
defendant, was involved even more deeply in the attack, 
particularly in preparing the explosive belts, giving them to the 
terrorists, and explaining to the potential suicide attackers how 
the belts should be activated.  At the same time, the defendant 
was not the ―driving force‖ behind the attack—that was a third 
person who planned the attack and on whose instructions all 
the other participants acted, both in relation to the preparation 
and the attempt to commit the attack.  It should also be noted 
that this third party was not tried by the court but rather by a 
higher force. 
Prima facie, in view of the decision in the case of Atzam 
 
99. Appeals (JS) 1917/04 Jauwad v. Military Prosecutor, [2004] 
(unpublished). 
100. Appeals (JS) 284 + 289/03 Military Prosecutor v. Mahmed Jerar 
and Counter Appeal, [2004] (unpublished). 
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Jerar, there was certainly no obstacle to imposing a sentence of 
life imprisonment on the defendant Mahmed Jerar.  In that 
case, however, the prosecution did not ask for a sentence of life 
imprisonment in the court of first instance, but merely 
―suitable punishment‖ (as part of an arrangement between the 
parties).  It is a well-known rule that only in exceptional cases 
will the court impose a sentence on the defendant that is not 
asked for by the prosecution, a fortiori when the sentence is 
one of life imprisonment, and even more so when the issue is 
the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment for an offence 
where no one was killed.  This was the background for the 
conflicting opinions in the judgment.  According to the majority 
opinion, the decisive factor was the fact that the accused was 
the dispatcher of a suicide terrorist and, therefore, according to 
the principles established earlier in the Atzam Jerar case, he 
had to be sentenced to life imprisonment.  According to the 
dissenting opinion, the decisive factor was the manner in which 
the prosecution had asked for the sentence, and, accordingly, 
on this view, the punishment that the accused merited was 
that imposed on him by the court of first instance—thirty years 
actual imprisonment. 
Based on these two judgments, it appears clear that the 
Military Court of Appeal applies a firm principle under which a 
―dispatcher‖ of a suicide terrorist will always be sentenced to 
life imprisonment irrespective of how the suicide terrorist acted 
after he was dispatched on his mission.  Likewise, a dispatcher 
will be defined broadly, i.e., any person belonging to the inner 
circle of the offence—that is to say, an accomplice.  Accordingly, 
it has frequently occurred that the sentence imposed on the 
dispatcher, in the broad sense, was life imprisonment, whereas 
the potential suicide terrorist was given a determinate 
sentence.  As already mentioned, an identical rationale 
supports the case law concerning persons confining themselves 
to ―procuring‖ a suicide attack, even if the attack fails.101 
 
E. The Transporter 
 
This category consists of defendants whose job is to escort 
 
101. Appeals (JS) 2805 + 3333/05 Abu Hamadiya v. Military Prosecutor 
and Counter Appeal, [2007] (unpublished). 
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potential suicide terrorists en route to executing attacks.  
Sometimes the transporters only escort the terrorist along a 
short stretch of the route.  When dealing with the category of 
the potential suicide terrorist, we considered the case of 
Bushkar and Ramadan.102  It will be recalled that that case 
concerned a potential suicide terrorist and his escort who were 
arrested in the seam line area en route to carry out a suicide 
attack using an explosives belt that awaited them near the 
scene of the planned attack.  The Military Court of Appeal 
imposed a sentence of twenty years imprisonment on the two, 
and we analyzed the reasons leading to this verdict.  The 
important point in relation to the transporter is the fact that 
the court made no punitive distinction whatsoever between the 
transporter and the prospective suicide terrorist.  We are not 
concerned here with the fact that the punitive outcome was 
identical, but rather with the manner in which the court 
achieved this result, specifically the court‘s failure to draw any 
distinction between the two ―jobholders.‖ 
Two additional cases also considered the position of people 
transporting prospective suicide terrorists, this time ones who 
retraced their footsteps—the cases of Ra’ed el Ashkar103 and 
Nagi el Ashkar104.  These cases concerned the transportation of 
a prospective suicide terrorist, Ali Sa‘id, who managed to cross 
the seam line into Israel but withdrew in view of the increased 
Israeli security presence.  He was later caught.  His position 
was reviewed earlier in relation to the category of prospective 
suicide terrorists.  With respect to each of the transporters, it 
was held as a matter of principle that a distinction had to be 
drawn between each of them and Sa‘id, as they had played a 
lesser role than he.  Accordingly, each of the transporters was 
sentenced to a lighter sentence than Sa‘id.  Thus, whereas Sa‘id 
was sentenced to a term of twenty-one years actual 
imprisonment, Nagi el Ashkar was sentenced to eighteen years 
imprisonment and Ra‘ed el Ashkar was sentenced to fifteen 
years imprisonment.  It should be noted that the distinction 
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between the two transporters stemmed from factual differences 
in the involvement of each in the transportation of Sa‘id. 
A comparison of these judgments shows that whereas in 
the Ramadan and Bushkar case, no distinction, whether 
fundamental or punitive, had been drawn between the 
prospective suicide terrorist and his transporter, in the Ra’ed el 
Ashkar case, the transporters were distinguished as a matter of 
principle in their favor compared to the prospective suicide 
terrorist.  Accordingly, each was given a more lenient sentence, 
reduced by a number of years compared to the prospective 
suicide terrorist, and a distinction was even drawn between the 
transporters inter se, in accordance with each one‘s role in the 
transportation process. 
In any event, when dealing with a transporter, it is clear 
that what happens to the prospective suicide terrorist is 
relevant in the same way that it is relevant to determining the 
appropriate sentence for the prospective suicide terrorist 
himself.  In contrast, what happens to the prospective suicide 
terrorist is irrelevant when it comes to sentencing dispatchers.  
The same outcome was achieved in the Hama’amra case.105  
That case concerned a defendant who escorted the prospective 
suicide terrorist over a long stretch of the route.  The terrorist 
and a second escort were later killed when the explosives in 
their car detonated.  The Military Court of Appeal treated the 
defendant as an accomplice to the offence, but not as one 
reaching the level of dispatcher, and, accordingly, he was not 
sentenced to a term of life imprisonment as he would have been 
had he been deemed a dispatcher.  Instead he was sentenced to 
a term of thirty years actual imprisonment, undoubtedly a 
heavy sentence, but still substantively and fundamentally 
different from life imprisonment.  Consequently, even though 
this escort was held to be an accomplice to the offence, the 
principal consideration in terms of the punishment was still 
the fate of the suicide terrorist (who certainly was closer to 
completing his part in the attack than those who retreated 
tactically as described above), and, accordingly, he was given a 
longer sentence than escorts of those who withdrew tactically. 
These issues have added importance when we return to a 
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consideration of the Atzam Jerar ruling, which, it will be 
recalled, was the guiding ruling in relation to dispatchers.  
There it was held that the accomplice to the attempt to execute 
a lethal suicide attack was similar to a dispatcher who was 
subject to a sentence of life imprisonment.  In the Hama’amra 
case, the escort was held to be an accomplice; nonetheless, the 
court did not deem him to be a dispatcher.  It is not clear 
whether by this the court intended to restrict the definition of 
dispatcher in the Atzam Jerar ruling; however, it is clear that, 
from the point of view of the court, a sharp line has to be drawn 
between the ―transporter‖ and the ―dispatcher,‖ in terms of 
both punitive considerations and punitive outcomes. 
 
F. The Intermediary 
 
As will be recalled, this category consists of persons who, 
even prior to the commencement of the planning of the attack, 
mediate between the prospective suicide terrorist and the 
infrastructure that sends that terrorist on his mission, either 
by way of identifying the infrastructure for the suicide terrorist 
or by way of identifying a suicide terrorist for the 
infrastructure. 
The issue of sentencing ―intermediaries‖ arose in the Abu 
Aiesha case.106  That case concerned the attack that was the 
subject of the Shalchati case referred to above, which ended 
with the death of the suicide terrorist and injuries to a number 
of civilians.  The accused in that case was the person who 
mediated between the infrastructure and the suicide terrorist.  
The court of first instance was asked as part of a plea bargain 
to sentence the accused to a term of eighteen years actual 
imprisonment.  The court, however, rejected this plea bargain 
and imposed a sentence of twenty-five years actual 
imprisonment.  The Military Court of Appeal reduced the 
sentence to make it consistent with the plea bargain and stated 
that while the plea bargain was lenient, it was not so extreme 
as to justify its rejection.  The main reason for this was the 
nature of the sentence imposed on Shalchati, namely, thirty 
years actual imprisonment.  It will be recalled that Shalchati‘s 
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function was to shoot passers-by following the explosion, but 
instead he ran away from the scene of the attack and thereby 
prevented a more serious death toll. 
It is clear from the judgment that the intermediary is not 
subject to the same punitive considerations as those applicable 
to the dispatcher, in view of the fact that he is not sentenced to 
life imprisonment.  A more meticulous reading of the judgment 
shows, however, that the court apparently also regards the 
position of the intermediary as less serious than that of the 
prospective suicide terrorist.  This is because there is a 
significant discrepancy in the punishment imposed on the 
intermediary and the punishment imposed on Shalchati, who 
planned to lose his life during the execution of the attack, even 
though Shalchati was credited with the fact that he did not 
complete his part of the attack.  Thus, the judgment relied on 
the premise that a more lenient sentence had to be imposed on 
the accused, Abu Aiesha, compared to Shalchati.  It should be 
noted that even if we regard the appropriate punishment for an 
intermediary to be slightly more severe than that imposed in 
this case, this conclusion remains valid.107 
An additional relevant judgment was that given in the case 
of Abu Saris,108 mentioned previously in a different context.  
That case concerned an accused who mediated between a 
suicide terrorist and the infrastructure, where the suicide 
terrorist blew himself up and as a result three people were 
injured.  The Military Court of Appeal upheld the sentence of 
twenty-two years actual imprisonment that was imposed on 
the accused by the lower court even though the court stated 
that it was only by miracle that the attack did not result in the 
loss of lives and that it could have, if it chose, imposed a more 
severe sentence. 
The result of this judgment is similar to the one reached in 
the Abu Aiesha case, which was even cited in the Abu Saris 
judgment.109  Thus, even in the most serious situation possible 
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in relation to a suicide attack that failed, where only a 
hairsbreadth separated the attack from one which achieved its 
goal—the murder of others—the intermediary was still only 
sentenced to a term of years—a term of years that was not even 
the maximum term available for determinate sentences, unlike 
the position applicable to the dispatcher and even the 
transporter.  If we take a step back we will recall that a 
comparable punishment was imposed on intermediaries in 
suicide attacks that did succeed in achieving lethal results. 
Thus, the position of an ―intermediary‖ is less grave than 
that of the ―potential suicide terrorist,‖ so that the fate of the 
latter dictates the punitive outcome of the former, subject to 
the appropriate punitive differential.  This result is not 
accidental as is clear if we recall the rulings of principle made 
in the Abu Saris case, which we have already discussed, where 
the prospective suicide terrorist was the principal perpetrator 
(even if only potentially so) and the intermediary was in the 
nature of an ―accessory.‖ 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
In recent years the State of Israel has faced the complex 
reality of multiple suicide attacks.  As a democracy, the state 
has chosen the legal process as the appropriate means for 
dealing with those participating in these attacks.  Among the 
legal systems operating in the State, the military courts in 
Judea and Samaria were chosen as the legal arena for facing 
this challenge.  As a result, in recent years, the military courts 
have dealt with the positions of numerous defendants who were 
involved in suicide attacks that both led and failed to achieve 
lethal outcomes.  As part of this process, the courts were 
required to contend with a variety of issues.  In this Article we 
have tried to present the principal issues while focusing 
primarily on the judgments of the Military Court of Appeal.  In 
the majority of judgments, if not all, the court recognized the 
need to find a balance between two important considerations.  
The first consideration is the importance of broadcasting a 
clear and unequivocal message to the effect that participating 
in this criminal phenomenon, which is so extraordinary in its 
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seriousness (particularly because of the atmosphere of terror it 
has instilled in the citizens of Israel since the establishment of 
the State of Israel and even from an earlier date), will lead to 
extraordinarily severe punishment.  The second consideration 
is the need to ensure compatibility between the circumstances 
of each specific attack and the punishment imposed. 
Accordingly, a policy of severe punishment has developed 
for those involved in suicide attacks, compared to those 
involved in other types of attacks.  Concurrently, this policy 
has created a hierarchy between the different types of 
participants in the suicide attacks that depends primarily on 
the role played in the attack and less on whether the attack 
has led to a lethal outcome or how close it has come to being 
lethal.  Suicide attacks have been defined broadly to include 
―no-escape attacks.‖  This outcome is desirable from the point 
of view of the goal of deterrence.  In various contexts, the 
courts impose harsher sentences for particular offences in order 
to increase the deterrent effect.110  From the point of view of 
this objective, it is important not only to impose harsher 
punishments, but also to create certainty that it will be 
imposed.  Therefore, a final outcome that consists of severe 
punishments that are uniform and stable is desirable from the 
point of view of the goal of deterrence.111 
Where the suicide attacks have led to a lethal outcome, 
this hierarchy is sometimes confined to the conceptual arena, 
in which distinctions are drawn between consecutive life 
sentences and concurrent life sentences or a single life 
sentence.  When the case involves accessories, however, the 
hierarchy sometimes leads to substantive and practical 
distinctions, so that these defendants are made subject 
exceptionally to a determinate sentence, albeit for a very 
lengthy period.  It should be noted that in this context no 
difference can be seen in the case law between the sentencing 
of participants in lethal suicide attacks and the sentencing of 
participants in ―other types‖ of murderous attacks. 
When the courts are concerned with suicide attacks which 
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have not led to a lethal outcome, a more severe approach has 
been taken than with respect to ―other types‖ of attacks which 
have not led to a lethal outcome, to the extent that the court 
has imposed sentences of life imprisonment—the maximum 
and exceptional sentence for the offence of attempting to cause 
death deliberately.  Naturally, here too a hierarchy has been 
created; however, bearing in mind the character of the offence 
and its circumstances, the range of sentences imposed within 
the framework of the hierarchy has been considerably broader 
than in relation to suicide attacks that have succeeded, to the 
point where the court has even imposed a determinate sentence 
of merely a few years imprisonment in exceptional cases of a 
more minor nature. 
Yet, placing the chief emphasis on the role played by 
participants in the attack has also led to a certain anomaly, 
from the point of view of the aspiration to achieve, or at least 
achieve in so far as possible, an outcome whereby the person 
dispatching the suicide terrorist is subject to a punishment of 
life imprisonment even if the suicide terrorist fails in his 
mission to bring about the deaths of others or is even not close 
to achieving this goal.  Indeed, on occasion, persons assisting a 
suicide attack that has led to the deaths of others are subject to 
a lesser punishment, both in practice and in quality—namely, 
imprisonment for a term of years. 
In any event, it is clear that the military court system in 
Judea and Samaria has considerable experience in dealing 
judicially with the monstrous phenomenon of suicide attacks.  
This experience may well be useful in the State of Israel and 
abroad, when legal systems are required to contend with this 
aberrant situation using the tools of a cultured nation. 
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